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AN ANALYSIS OF USMC FACILITIES SUPPORT CONTRACTS 
WITH A FOCUS ON BASE MAINTENANCE 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research was to provide recommendations to improve the 
Marine Corps facilities support contract (FSC) process and encourage innovation. In 
order to achieve this objective, three research questions were answered. First, what are 
the current practices and processes used for USMC contracting? Second, what 
commercial and governmental best business practices can the USMC implement to 
improve the FSC process? Third, what strategies and practices can the USMC use to 
promote innovation in FSCs?  
These questions were answered by reviewing Marine Corps FSC files, 
researching service contracting best business practices, and ascertaining strategies to 
encourage innovation. After a comparative analysis, eight recommendations were 
identified to improve the FSC process. The first four recommendations involve the 
implementation of the following best business practices. First, foster a better utilization of 
the Integrated Project Team (the team responsible for designing the requirement as well 
as managing and evaluating the acquisition effort). Second, leverage the benefits of 
strategic sourcing. Third, improve data collection and forecasting. Last, improve the 
ability to share lessons learned. The remaining four recommendations offer strategies to 
encourage innovation. First, allow the contractor and government personnel to be 
innovative. Second, use private sector advisors to learn the most current processes and 
technological advancements. Third, provide both the contractors and government 
personnel with incentives to innovate. Last, create a culture of innovation. 
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This chapter presents the background, purpose, research questions, and scope for 
a comparative analysis among commercial, governmental, and United States Marine 
Corps best business practices when contracting for services. Also analyzed are strategies 
that would encourage innovation in service contracting. Additionally, this chapter 
describes the methodology of the research and the organization of the study.   
A. BACKGROUND  
According to the Mihm (2017), the acquisition of services accounted for half of 
the $273.5 billion the Department of Defense (DOD) set aside in fiscal year (FY) 2015 
for goods and services. In 2016, the Marine Corps was authorized $5.2 billion in 
Operating Forces (BA-1) funding (Office of the Secretary of the Navy, 2015). The 
USMC allocated 55.7% ($2.9 billion) of total BA-1 funding to Base Support (Office of 
the Secretary of the Navy, 2015). Of the $2.9 billion in Base Support funding, the USMC 
executed roughly $634.8 million on Facilities sustainment, restoration, modernization, 
and demolition (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, 2016). This calculates to 21.9% 
of total Base Support funding. Given the high amount of appropriated funds executed on 
Facilities Support Contracts (FSC) it is prudent to continually seek efficiencies and cost 
reduction methods through the implementation of best business practices and innovative 
solutions. Furthermore, doing so is directly in line with Marine Corps cost control 
initiatives and the DOD Better Buying Power 3.0 (Under Secretary of Defense 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2015). Headquarters Marine Corps, Installation 
and Logistics has requested research be conducted to identify commercial and 
governmental best business practices for services contracting as well as research 
strategies and processes to encourage innovation when contracting for services. 
B. PURPOSE  
This research provides the USMC with recommendations to improve the FSC 
process and encourage innovation. This was accomplished via a comparative analysis 
between USMC practices and industry practices. USMC practices were determined by 
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reviewing publicly available FSC documents. Industry practices was determined by 
researching commercial and governmental service contracting best business practices as 
well as strategies to promote innovation.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Contracting for services is a dynamic activity in which practices and processes 
quickly become obsolete and new practices, and processes are adopted on a continual 
basis. Continuous process improvement, efficiency, and innovative solutions are the 
lifeblood of the Marine Corps and ingrained in every Marine’s mind. Maintaining such an 
environment requires constant study and refinement of current practices and procedures. 
It is with this intent that the following research questions have been developed:  
1. What are the current practices and processes used for USMC facilities 
support contracting?  
2. What commercial and governmental best business practices can the 
USMC implement to improve the FSC process?  
3. What strategies and practices can the USMC implement to encourage 
innovation in FSCs?  
D. SCOPE  
A complete review of all Marine Corps facilities support  contracts is unfeasible; 
therefore, current Marine Corps practices and processes have been derived from limited 
solicitations obtained via the government-wide point of entry (Federal Business 
Opportunities). Research on best business practices cover all phases of the contract life 
cycle, however, limited information was available describing the USMC’s current FSC 
processes during the award and post-award phase of the contract life cycle. Therefore, the 
comparative analysis is limited when comparing processes taking place outside of the 
pre-award phase. Best business practices and strategies to encourage innovation violating 
government procurement laws will not be discussed. All best business practices identified 
in this paper focus on the buyer’s perspective since this is the role predominantly played 
by the USMC during facilities support contracting. Due to the sheer volume of literature 
supporting this topic it is impossible to review every practice and procedure that has been 
documented; therefore, the author focuses on practices and procedures common across 
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multiple sources. The author’s recommendations are based on solutions that will not 
require a large investment or an increase in personnel. A manpower analysis is not part of 
the scope of this project. 
E. METHODOLOGY  
In order to answer the research questions, this study was organized into four 
stages. First, a literature review was conducted to establish the regulatory framework of 
government procurement, identify commercial and governmental best business practices 
when contracting for services, and discuss strategies and practices to encourage 
innovation when contracting for services. Second, Marine Corps facilities support  
contract documentation was collected and analyzed. This analysis established a baseline 
of Marine Corps facilities support  contract processes. The third stage of this study 
involved conducting a comparative analysis of current Marine Corps processes against 
best business practices and innovation encouraging strategies found in commercial and 
governmental service contracting. The fourth stage consisted of synthesizing the results 
of the comparative analysis in order to provide relevant recommendations to improve 
Marine Corps facilities support  contract processes and procedures.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY  
A high-level view of the project’s history and latitude was provided above. This 
served as the foundation throughout the project’s completion. A very brief outline of the 
successive chapters is detailed below.  
The literature review in the second chapter examines regulations, regulation 
supplements, academic articles, textbooks, case studies, and reports with respect to 
service contacting best business practices and strategies to encourage innovation. 
Furthermore, the chapter serves to provide a baseline of the current practices and 
processes utilized in Marine Corps facilities support  contracts. 
In Chapter III, the research collection procedures, analysis method, assumptions, 
and list of limitations are provided.   
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Findings are offered to summarize current USMC FCS process, address best 
business practices the USMC can implement to improve current FSC processes, and 
discuss strategies that will encourage innovation in FSCs.   
The project closes with conclusions and recommendations. A summary of the 
research and findings derived from the comparative analysis as well as areas requiring 
further research are presented in this chapter.  
G. SUMMARY  
This chapter provided the background and purpose for the research contained in 
the subsequent pages. Additionally, the research questions, scope, methodology, and a 
general outline were provided.  
The next chapter discusses, in detail, the references reviewed which provided the 
author with a base knowledge in services contracting. These references include 
acquisition regulations, reports, academic articles, case studies, and published guidebooks 
pertaining to services contracting. The next chapter also reviews the USMC FSC 
solicitations that provided the author with the outline of current USMC FCS processes 
and procedures.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter outlines the regulatory framework established by the United States 
Code and codified in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS), Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (NMCARS), Marine Corps Acquisition Procedures Supplement 
(MAPS), Circular A-76, and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.74. This 
chapter also identifies commercial and governmental best business practices when 
contracting for services as well as strategies to encourage innovation. Best business 
practices for service contracting and strategies to encourage innovation were gleaned 
through the review of reports, academic articles, case studies, and published guidebooks. 
This includes government sources such as public law, Under Secretary of Defense Better 
Buying Power 3.0, the Department of Defense Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services, 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, the Defense Technical Information 
Center, and Acquisition Centers of Excellence in Service Contracting. Civilian sources 
include RAND Corporation reports, the Acquisition Research Journal, Program 
Manager Magazine, Harvard Business Review, National Contract Management 
Association, the Young Entrepreneur Council, and other sources.  
A. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
Navy and Marine Corps contracts are bound by regulations and statutory 
requirements. Regardless of the documented successes, certain processes and procedures 
cannot be implemented if such processes and procedures violate the statutory and 
regulatory requirements set forth by the U.S. government and the Navy. For this reason, 
the regulatory framework, in which Marine Corps contracts are obliged to comply, must 
first be identified before analyzing commercial and governmental best business practices.  
Government procurement rules and regulations are set forth in statute. The FAR, 
DFARS, NMCARS, and DoDI 5000.74 are regulations that implement said statutes. The 
FAR, however, is the cornerstone regulation establishing the official government policy 
for the acquisition of services.  
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The FAR (2015) provides the official government policy with respect to 
contracting for services by providing the following rules: 
1. Performance-based acquisition (see subpart 37.6) is the preferred method 
for acquiring services (Public Law 106–398, section 821). 
2. Agencies shall generally rely on the private sector for commercial 
services. 
3. Agencies shall not award a contract for the performance of an inherently 
governmental function. 
4. Non-personal service contracts are proper under general contracting 
authority. 
5. Agency program officials are responsible for accurately describing the 
need to be filled, or problem to be resolved, through service contracting in 
a manner that ensures full understanding and responsive performance by 
contractors and, in so doing, should obtain assistance from contracting 
officials, as needed. 
6. Agencies shall establish effective management practices in accordance 
with Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 93–1, 
Management Oversight of Service Contracting, to prevent fraud, waste, 
and abuse in service contracting. 
7. Services are to be obtained in the most cost-effective manner, without 
barriers to full and open competition, and free of any potential conflicts of 
interest. 
8. Agencies shall ensure that sufficiently trained and experienced officials 
are available within the agency to manage and oversee the contract 
administration function. 
9. Agencies shall ensure that service contracts that require the delivery, use, 
or furnishing of products are consistent with part 23. (Part 37.102). 
Further description of performance-based contracting, inherently governmental functions, 
full and open competition, and additional relevant rules are provided below.  
1. Performance-Based Contracting  
The mandate to use performance-based contracting procedures is common to all 
acquisition regulations, instructions, and supplements. In fact, NMCARS 5237.170-2 
(2016) necessitates the need for approval to not use performance-based contracting 
procedures. Approval authority comes from the Head of Contracting Agency (HCA) for 
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all services acquisitions less than $50 million, approval from the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Acquisition and Procurement for services contracts between 
$50 million and $100 million, and approval from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation for services contracts between $100 million 
and $250 million (Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
[NMCARS], 2016). 
Performance-based contracting, as defined in FAR 2.101, is “an acquisition 
structured around the results to be achieved as opposed to the manner by which the work is to 
be performed” (FAR, 2017). Furthermore, FAR 37.601(b) (2015) provides three 
requirements for performance-based contracts: “a performance work statement (PWS), 
measurable performance standards and the method of assessing contractor performance 
against performance standards, and performance incentives where appropriate” (FAR, 2015). 
a. Performance Work Statement  
According to FAR 2.101, a PWS is “a statement of work for performance-based 
acquisitions that describes the required results in clear, specific and objective terms with 
measureable outcomes” (FAR, 2017). Additionally, FAR 37.602 (2015) expands upon 
the definition by including the direction to “describe the work in terms of the required 
results rather than either how the work is to be accomplished or the number of hours to be 
provided” (FAR, 2015). As explained by Rendon (2001), “the PWS is one of the most 
critical documents in the outsourcing process” (p. 18). Subsequently, he explains that 
contract success is determined by a valid, complete, and accurate PWS. This allows the 
contractor to design his or her own performance methods while maintaining 
responsibility for performance quality (Rendon, 2001). The most notable difference 
between a PWS and a Statement of Work (SOW) is the absence of specific direction with 
which the work is to be completed (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2010). 
Lastly, it is difficult to achieve an efficacious contract without continually reviewing the 
PWS (Rendon, 2001). Continuous PWS reviews may result in PWS modifications 
because of a change in requirements, technology, contract standards, or to address 
problem areas (Rendon, 2001).    
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b. Measurable Performance Standards and the Method to Assess Them  
The Office of Personnel Management (n.d.) describes measurable performance 
standards, in the context of human resources, as “a management-approved expression of 
the performance threshold(s), requirement(s), or expectation(s) that must be met to be 
appraised at a particular level of performance” (“Definition,” para. 1). This definition 
applies not just to human resources, but contracting as well. The standards and contractor 
performance level must be objective and quantifiable. Objective quantifiable standards 
provide the vehicle for determining contractor performance level. Performance level 
evaluation is then used to determine if the contractor is meeting the contract requirements 
or if the contractor has earned any incentives. It also plays a key role in the completion of 
the Contractor Performance Assessment Report (Office of Personnel Management, n.d.). 
These reports have the ability to influence a contractor’s award of future government 
contracts or receipt of any incentives/awards. In order to ensure the proper surveillance 
FAR 37.114 states that “a sufficient number of qualified Government employees are 
assigned to oversee contractor activities, especially those that involve support of 
Government policy or decision making” (FAR, 2015). “Sufficient number” depends on 
the scope and complexity of the contracted service; it can range from just a few 
individuals to dozens.   
The Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) details the method of assessing 
performance standards and contains the processes, location, personnel, timing, and 
metrics the government will use when assessing performance (DAU, 2011). DFARS 
237.172 mandates that the QASP be completed at the same time the PWS is being 
generated (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [DFARS], 2016). 
Additionally, the QASP must link each performance objective to a method of inspection 
(DAU, 2011) and be designed to mitigate the contract type performance risks and work 
effort (DFARS, 2016). The Defense Acquisition University (2011) has posted a QASP 
template created by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. This QASP template may be viewed in Appendix A.   
Surveillance requirements is captured by one of two mandatory clauses in all 
services contracts, FAR clause 52.246-4 (1996) or FAR clause 52.246-5 (1984). The full 
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text of these two clauses can be viewed in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. In 
short, both clauses require the contractor to maintain a quality assurance system, allow 
the government to inspect and test all services, correct unsatisfactory work at no charge 
to the government, and serve as a notice to the contractor that the government may 
terminate the contract for failing to complete or re-complete the work described in the 
terms and conditions of the contract (FAR, 1996; FAR, 1984).   
c. Performance Incentives  
According to FAR 37.602(b)(3), the goal of performance incentives is to 
encourage a contractor to perform at a level above that which is stipulated in the work 
statement (FAR, 2015). Providing an incentive on certain areas of a contract results in the 
contractor focusing more on the incentive areas than other non-incentivized areas. This 
fact is supported by FAR 16.101 guidance to tailor incentives toward areas of 
disproportionate risks (FAR, 2017). Hence, the reason performance incentives are not 
mandatory but rather used when appropriate (FAR, 2015).  
2. Inherently Governmental Functions  
FAR 37.114(a) (2015) states, “functions being performed shall not be changed or 
expanded to become inherently governmental” (FAR, 2015). Furthermore, contractors 
should never be tasked to perform inherently governmental functions (Department of 
Defense [DOD], 2016; DFARS, 2008). Inherently governmental functions are activities 
tied so closely to the public interest that government employees are required to perform 
them (Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2003; Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy [OFPP], 2011). OMB Circular A-76 (2003) continues by providing the following 
four descriptions of what inherently governmental activity involves 
1. Binding the United States to take or not take some action by contract, 
policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise.  
2. Determining, protecting, and advancing economic, political, territorial, 
property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or 
criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise. 
3. Significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private persons. 
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4. Exerting ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of 
United States property (real or personal, tangible or intangible), including 
establishing policies or procedures for the collection, control, or 
disbursement of appropriated and other federal funds (p. A-2). 
OMB’s guidance on this matter concludes with a warning that use of discretion is not 
convincing evidence of an activity being inherently governmental. OMB states that such 
“discretion shall be deemed inherently governmental if it commits the government to a 
course of action when two or more alternative courses of action exist and decision 
making is not already limited or guided by existing policies, procedures, directions, 
orders, and other guidance” (OMB, 2003, p. A-2). This is not to say that contractors 
cannot be part of the team developing or executing a course of action, but rather cannot 
be the sole developer or executer of said course of action. In all instances, however, the 
agency must maintain contractor oversight (OMB, 2003). 
3. Competition Requirements    
In 1984, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) was passed by Congress. 
CICA mandated full and open competition as well as the requirement to advertise all 
procurements over $25,000 for at least 15 days (MAS, 2012). FAR part 6 Competition 
Requirements was then promulgated to provide the regulatory procedures ensuring 
compliance with CICA. FAR 6.101 (2017) requires all contracting officers to “promote 
and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government 
contracts” (FAR, 2017). Full and open competition may be achieved through “sealed 
bidding,” “competitive proposals,” “combination of competitive procedures,” or “other 
competitive procedures” (FAR, 2017, Part 6.102). According to the FAR (2017), sealed 
bidding is used on all service contracts when the following conditions are met: 
1. Time permits the solicitation, submission, and evaluation of sealed bids 
2. The award will be made on the basis of price and other price related 
factors  
3. It is not necessary to conduct discussions with the responding offerors 
about their bids 
4. There is reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed bid. 
(Part 6.401(a)). 
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Simply put, service contracts are not exempt from the requirements established by CICA 
in 1984.   
4. Additional Regulations  
The FAR and supporting supplements contain a few more rules that must be noted 
in order to complete the regulatory framework. Of particular note is FAR part 22 
Application of Labor Laws to Government Acquisitions (FAR, 2017). FAR part 22 
contains mandatory provisions on minimum wage, working conditions, benefits, 
equivalent federal employee wage rates, and employee notification of the information 
mentioned above (FAR, 2017). Additionally, the FAR (2017) requires contractors to 
pay their employees at least the wages and fringe benefits found by the 
Department of Labor to prevail in the locality or, in the absence of a wage 
determination, the minimum wage set forth in the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (Part  1002-2). 
Specific requirements exist with respect to a service contract’s period of 
performance. Per FAR 37.106 (2015), service contracts may only be awarded with a one 
year period of performance (FAR, 2015). However, DFARS 237.106 allows performance 
of a severable service to start in one fiscal year and end in another fiscal year while being 
fully funded with current fiscal year dollars as long as the performance period does not 
exceed one calendar year (DFARS, 2016). According to the Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (2015), “Severable services are continuing and recurring in 
nature...the benefits are realized when the services are provided, even if the contract is 
not performed to completion” (p. 53).   
The type of services that may be contracted for are restricted by regulation. FAR 
37.104(b) states, “Agencies shall not award personal services contracts unless specifically 
authorized by statute to do so” (FAR, 2015). FAR (2015) identifies personal services as 
being “characterized by the employer-employee relationship it creates between the 
Government and the contractor’s personnel” (Part 37.104). This relationship places the 
contractor under “relatively continuous supervision and control of a Government officer 
or employee” (FAR, 2015, Part 37.104). 
 12 
Three more FAR clauses are required on all service contracts in addition to FAR 
and FAR 52.246-5. FAR 52.237-1 and FAR 52.237-2 are required on all non-
construction service contracts on government installations. FAR 52.237-1 urges offerors 
to inspect the area in which services are to be provided in order to submit more accurate 
quotes (FAR, 1984). FAR 52.237-2 requires contractors to “use reasonable care to avoid 
damaging existing buildings, equipment, and vegetation on the government installation” 
(FAR, 1984). Lastly, FAR 52.237-3 is required for all vital services in which service 
interruption is not tolerable (FAR, 1991). The full text of the above mentioned FAR 
clauses can be viewed in Appendix D through F, respectively.  
B. SERVICE CONTRACTING BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES  
Service contracting best business practices are presented within the three phases 
of the contract life cycle, as detailed in The Contract Management Standard (National 
Contract Management Association [NCMA], Version 1.0, n.d.) and World Class 
Contracting (Garrett, 2010). The three phases of contract management are the pre-award 
phase, award phase, and post-award phase (Garrett, 2010; NCMA, Version 1.0, n.d.). A 
brief description of each contracting phase is provided as the introduction to each 
subsection and followed by best business practices common in the commercial and 
governmental arenas.  
1. Pre-Award Phase  
The National Contract Management Association (NCMA, Version 1.0, n.d.) 
describes pre-award phase activities as “shaping the customer requirements for products 
or services, and then developing a comprehensive acquisition plan to fulfill those 
requirements in a timely manner at a reasonable price” (p. 6). Garrett (2010) describes the 
pre-award phase in a little more detail. He adds that during the pre-award phase, the 
buyer will conduct “procurement planning, solicitation planning, and solicitation” 
(Garrett, 2010, p. 20). Though slightly different, both NCMA (2017) and Garrett (2010) 
describe the phase in similar terms. The bottom line is best business practices in the pre-
award phase include anything that guides the procurement plan or acquisition plan as 
well as the solicitation structure or strategy. The pre-award phase ends with the release of 
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a Request for Proposal (RFP) (Garrett, 2010). Subsections a through f provide some of 
the documented commercial and governmental best business practices that will support 
contracting for services in the pre-award phase of the contract life cycle.   
a. Seven Steps to Service Acquisition   
The DOD (2016) has created seven steps for all service acquisitions. Each step is 
supported by the commercial marketplace and described throughout this subsection. As 
outlined by DOD (2016), the seven-step process for service acquisitions is provided 
below: 
1. Form the Team  
2. Review Current Strategy  
3. Perform Market Research  
4. Define Requirements  
5. Develop Acquisition Strategy  
6. Execute Strategy  
7. Manage Performance (p. 4)  
Steps one through five take place in the pre-award phase, step six is the award 
phase, and step seven is the post-award phase. Steps one through five are briefly 
described below using guidance provided by the DoDI 5000.74 (DOD, 2016), General 
Services Administration’s (GSA) 7 Steps to Performance Based Services Acquisitions 
(GSA, 2005), and the DOD’s Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services (DOD, 2012). 
Step six is discussed in the award phase section and step seven in the post-award section. 
Step one is “Form the Team” (DOD, 2016, p. 4). According to GSA (2005), the 
“team” is known as an Integrated Project Team (IPT). An IPT consists of senior 
management, key stakeholders, and the IPT members. IPT members should be comprised 
of multiple disciplines and have their roles and responsibilities clearly defined in an IPT 
charter. A well-rounded IPT is more capable of properly defining requirements, resolving 
problems, selecting the best course of action, analyzing proposals, and inspecting 
completed services (GSA, 2005). Team formation includes rules of conduct developed 
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using the forming, storming, norming, performing, and adjourning framework in order to 
facilitate collaboration and efficiency (Prajapati, 2016). Prajapati (2016) goes on to 
explain that understanding the team dynamic and developing the team through the 
various stages of the team formation process results in a higher performing group. DOD 
(2012) explains that IPT members must be empowered to make decisions during the 
contract life cycle. Furthermore, the knowledge gained throughout the process must be 
retained and passed down as new members join the group to replace other members that 
are moving. Lastly, the GSA (2005) notes the importance of tying incentives to program 
goals vice acquisition goals in order to provide incentives based on deliverables vice the 
number of awarded contracts or contract actions.   
Step two is “Review Current Strategy” (DOD, 2016, p. 4). A proper review of the 
strategy/plan includes analyzing the current methods used and evaluating their 
effectiveness as well as determining what can or should be improved (DOD, 2012). 
Commercial companies have long considered the review of current strategy to be a 
critical step during acquisition planning (Rappaport, 1979). Although in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions, Rappaport (1979) explains that completing an acquisition 
strategy analysis will aid in defining objectives and criteria. Rappaport’s explanation 
directly applies in contracting. Objectives and criteria must include the use of 
performance metrics and incentives as part of the acquisition strategy/plan, especially in a 
sole source acquisition, in order to gain continued efficiencies and cost savings (DOD, 
2016). This will help ensure that industry obtains a fair and reasonable profit while the 
government maintains supplier flexibility, especially when significant intellectual 
property issues are present. The use of “should cost” analysis and cost reduction targets is 
mandatory (DOD, 2016, p. 5). Lastly, DOD (2012) explains that a review of the current 
strategy provides the acquisition planners with a view of past performance. Indications 
that past performance was poor may result in a restructured acquisition strategy (DOD, 
2012).  
Step three is “Perform Market Research” (DOD, 2016, p. 4). Conducting market 
research provides a competitive advantage and mitigates buyer risks (Hargraves, 2008). 
The goal of market research when contracting for services is to provide government 
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acquisition professionals with knowledge of industry capabilities and technology in order 
to maximize the use of commercially available services (GSA, 2005). GSA (2005) 
explains how market research drives the “government’s ability to purchase best-value 
products and services” and must be a continual process, even in the absence of a 
requirement (p. 11). Hargraves (2008) concurs with GSA (2005) and explains that market 
research “should itself be active, dynamic and constantly undergoing revision” 
(Hargraves, 2008, p. 1). GSA (2005) argues that the entire IPT must be involved and 
committed to market research. Communications with private-sector suppliers must be 
established prior to the creation of an acquisition strategy. Such communications can be 
generated through industry days, requests for information, sources sought notices on the 
government-wide point of entry, or pre-solicitation conferences (GSA, 2005). It is 
important to note, as explained by the GSA (2005), that market research does not simply 
mean studying the private-sector, but includes the public-sector as well. Many agencies 
have faced the same problems and can often provide inter-agency support, collaboration, 
or share their lessons learned/best business practices from past experience (GSA, 2005). 
Additionally, market research is not confined to supplier capabilities but includes their 
best practices, performance measurement methods and metrics, delivery methods, and 
incentive structures (DOD, 2012). Lastly, market research must include a review of 
current government contracts (FAR, 2016). FAR 10.002(b)(2)(iv) guides the market 
researcher to the government contract directory in order to research if any multiple 
agency contracts that can be leveraged to fulfill the requirement exist (FAR, 2016).   
Step four is “Define Requirements” (DOD, 2016, p. 4). The GSA (2005) states, 
“The most effective foundation for an acquisition is the intended effect of the contract in 
supporting and improving an agency’s mission and performance goals and objectives” 
(GSA, 2005, p. 9). GSA (2005) is describing the need to properly define the requirement 
in order to legitimize contractual actions. In fact, poorly defined requirements and 
changes in requirements are the two main factors causing contracts to overrun schedule 
and cost (EnFocus Solutions, 2012). GSA (2005) recognizes the criticality of a defined 
requirement and guides the acquisition team to first develop the desired end-state. The 
end-state should be described at the highest level possible and take into account all 
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information developed from step three. Similar or previous requirements cannot be 
simply regurgitated on the new contract, but must be synthesized by the IPT. Once the 
IPT determines the end-state they must decide how to identify when the end-state has 
been achieved. Part of this process includes identifying the key elements for achieving a 
successful outcome (GSA, 2005). 
Step five is “Develop Acquisition Strategy” (DOD, 2016, p. 4). This step includes 
determining contract type, incentives (discussed further in subsection e), determining 
evaluation criteria, and allocating workload (DOD, 2012). With regards to contract type, 
FAR 37.102 (2015) prioritizes a fixed-price contract structure for service acquisitions 
(FAR, 2015). DAU (2010) identifies lowest-price-technically-acceptable (LPTA) and 
trade-off as the two most common proposal evaluation methods. LPTA is based solely on 
awarding the contract to the lowest bidder that meets the government’s minimum 
technical requirement. The trade-off method awards the contract after considering and 
weighing both price and non-price factors. The non-price factors may include past 
performance, technical capability, reliability, or proposed solution (DAU, 2010). Lastly, 
the workload required during this process is steep, so distributing work throughout the 
IPT is the only effective method of accomplishing the task (DOD, 2012).   
b. Bidders Conferences  
Garrett (2010) elucidates how complex requirements are accompanied by elevated 
levels of risk, to both the buyer and the seller. Even the most detailed and scrutinized 
requirements documents may be misinterpreted by potential offerors. The result of such 
misinterpretation could lead to proposals and quotes that are infeasible, based on the 
vendor’s capabilities or the allotted timeline to satisfy the contract requirements. The use 
of bidders’ conferences is a popular tool to alleviate the risk of having a misinformed 
vendor (Garrett, 2010). Such conferences can be held before releasing the RFP, to aid in 
acquisition planning, or after releasing the solicitation and before any proposals are 
submitted, to clarify any questions posed by offerors. The commercial sector is an avid 
user of the bidders conference; however, a more popular civilian term is the pre-bid 
meeting (Lynch, 2013). Both the bidders conference and pre-bid meeting are identical in 
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terms of purpose and execution (Garrett, 2010; Lynch, 2013). A bidders’ conference is a 
meeting between the buyer and prospective sellers. The conference is held before the 
seller prepares a proposal and can be conducted in person, video conference, telephone, 
or online. Garrett (2010) describes the purpose of the bidders conference as a method to 
allow the buyer to answer any vendor questions regarding technical or contract 
requirements. This helps to ensure a common understanding of the buyer’s needs and 
allows the contractor to submit a proposal within their capabilities and profit 
requirements.  
c. Strategic Sourcing   
Though not specifically related to the contract management life cycle, many 
organizations use a strategic sourcing approach for the acquisition of services. Strategic 
sourcing is defined as “the collaborative and structured process of critically analyzing an 
organization’s spending and using this information to make business decisions about 
acquiring commodities and services more effectively and efficiently” (GSA, n.d., para. 
1). In short, use an enterprise-wide approach to procure common items as one big 
customer, rather than numerous small customers. According to The National Association 
of State Procurement Officers (2013) the practice of strategic sourcing was first 
introduced into the commercial sector in the 1980s (National Association of State 
Procurement Officers [NASPO], 2013). In 2003, the Air Force launched their first 
strategic sourcing program to guide the acquisition of computers (Rendon, 2005). By 
2005, strategic sourcing was formally implemented by the federal government via the 
OMB memorandum Implementing Strategic Sourcing (OMB, 2005). Strategic sourcing 
allows the buyer to leverage their aggregate demand to increase buying power, reduce the 
number of suppliers, better understand spending patterns, improve quality, increase 
efficiencies, and achieve savings (NASPO, 2013).  
In 2006 the USD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) released a 
memorandum titled, Acquisition of Services Policy (Krieg, 2006). This memorandum 
contained five objectives, one of which is that “services are acquired using a strategic, 
enterprise-wide approach, which is applied to both the planning and execution of the 
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acquisition” (Krieg, 2006, p. 1). Then in September 2012, GAO recommended for the 
DOD to set strategic sourcing goals, establish procedures to track strategic sourcing 
efforts, and create metrics to track progress toward meeting the strategic sourcing goals. 
In response, DOD created senior management positions for the acquisition of services 
and designated officials responsible for strategic sourcing as well as established offices to 
identify and implement strategic sourcing opportunities (DiNapoli, 2017).  
The Air Force first outsourced base operations support (BOS), the equivalent of 
the USMC’s FSC, in 1996 (Rendon, 2001). Then in 2001, the RAND report Federal 
Contract Bundling provided the Air Force with a framework for bundling contracts as 
well as a rationale supporting the bundling of multiple services into fewer larger contracts 
(Baldwin, Camm, & Moore, 2001). Baldwin et al. (2001) explains that strategically 
reducing supply bases allows the formation of partnerships with more integrated service 
providers. This partnership then allows the buyer to reap the rewards of continuous 
process improvement across the entire spectrum of the services being provided. The 
result is improved performance and reduced costs. The formation of said partnerships is 
nearly impossible when numerous providers are used. Furthermore, commercial 
companies have reportedly achieved their greatest improvements when they reduce their 
supply base by 40 to 50 percent (Baldwin, Camm, & Moore, 2001).  
The Air Force has led the services in strategic sourcing. The Air Force has created 
three Enterprise Sourcing Squadrons (ESS) that fall under the Air Force Installation 
Contracting Agency (AFICA). ESS 771, 772, and 773 are responsible for strategic 
sourcing and enterprise-wide acquisition solutions. ESS 771 serves as the Air Force’s 
Center of Excellence (COE) for strategically sourced installation-level commodities 
(AFICA, 2016). In 2013, the Air Force announced plans to standardize contracted base 
operations support (Weckerlein, 2013). A standard list of installation support services 
comprised of 40 functions was generated. The standardized list can be used to generate 
one large contract to provide the 40 standard installation support services to all Air Force 
installations. Between FY11-FY16 the Air Force managed 11 projects utilizing strategic 
sourcing and realized $481.68 million in cost savings (Headquarters United States Air 
Force [HQUSAF], 2017).     
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d. Information Tracking and Forecasting  
In 2012, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OSD) Director, Defense 
Pricing released a memorandum titled, Taxonomy for the Acquisition of Services and 
Supplies & Equipment in order to provide a map of product service codes (PSC) 
containing 16 portfolio groups and 70 portfolios (Assad, 2012). According to Mr. Shay 
Assad’s approved taxonomy, Facility Related Services make up one portfolio group 
containing nine portfolios, one of which is Building and Plant Maintenance (Code 540, 
Category 24, PSC Z Maintenance and Repair of Facilities). DOD (2016) designates the 
taxonomy portfolios as the vehicle for tracking services purchased by the DOD as a 
whole. This data can be synthesized to conduct spend analyses and forecasting. DOD 
explicitly supports the use of the taxonomy and states, “Portfolio management enables a 
framework for strategic oversight by the USD AT&L, coupled with decentralized 
execution by the DOD Components” (DOD, 2016, p. 13). DOD (2016) explains that 
addressing requirements from an enterprise-level ensures contracts align with mission, 
performance, and cost objectives. Furthermore, DOD mandates management procedures 
and systems to ensure that all service contracts are categorized with a PSC established by 
the taxonomy for acquisition of services, at the contract line item level (DOD, 2016).  
Mihm (2017) explains that in order to improve service acquisition and budget 
forecasting one must know “what the department is buying today and what it intends to 
buy in the future” (p. 484). Forecasting is part of the lifeblood of private businesses. 
Forecasting not only enables better planning but also enables a company/agency to 
manipulate objectives in order to succeed in changing marketplaces (Lambert, 2011). 
Even though the importance of forecasting is well known and an established taxonomy 
for the acquisition of services exist, military branches are only tracking requirements for 
the current year plus one future year (MIHM, 2017). Recently, Army Command Program 
Guidance Memorandum was released requiring each command to forecast service 
requirements for FYs 2018–2022 (MIHM, 2017). Analyzing the data captured, via proper 
use of the taxonomy, facilitates forecasting multiple years in the future. Accurate 
forecasts enable more effective cost reductions as well as highlight growing programs 
that may require additional future funding.  
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e. Incentives  
Private companies are motivated primarily by profit; therefore, properly 
structured incentives are effective tools for modifying, encouraging, discouraging, and 
guiding contractors’ behaviors. Since the industrial revolution, the use of incentives, in 
the commercial marketplace, has been a popular approach to guiding employee, supplier, 
and customer behavior (Work Place Consultants, n.d.). Some of the earliest incentives 
took the form of employee pensions designed to convince a business’s workforce to stay 
with the company for decades (Work Place Consultants, n.d.). It was not until the 1960s, 
however, that government contract incentives began to gain popularity (Hildebrandt, 
1998). The use of incentives has continued to gain steam. In fact, FAR part 37 (2015) 
encourages the use of performance incentives (both monetary and non-monetary) when 
using performance-based contracting methods. However, a 2008–2009 survey consisting 
of 300 collective responses from the Army, Navy, and Air Force found that just over 93 
percent of service acquisitions did not incorporate incentives (Rendon, Apte, & Apte, 
2012). Rendon goes on to explain that the high percentage of contracts not using 
incentives may be a result of contracting for commercial services. Commercial services 
typically have a well-defined end state and vendors understand the process of providing 
the service, therefore, incentives to reward the contractor for going above and beyond the 
base requirement may not be desired (Rendon et al. 2012). One common knowledge idea, 
however, is the contractor will almost never go above the base requirement without an 
incentive to do so.  
The DOD’s Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services offers sage advice when 
attaching an incentive structure to a service contract (DOD, 2012). The DOD explains the 
criticality of understanding the ramifications of assigning the incentive. Contractors will 
always place more emphasis on earning the maximum incentive, even at the cost of 
negative performance in other non-incentivized areas. The importance of tying incentives 
directly to the mission and contract goals cannot be understated. It is also important to 
understand that incentives can be either positive (giving the contractor more money for 
going above and beyond) or negative (contractually forcing the vendor to do re-work at 
no added charge for unsatisfactory deliverables) (DOD, 2012). DOD (2012) and GSA 
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(2005) identify some of the more common types of incentives. These include 
performance incentives (based on objective measurable criteria), award fee/term (based 
on subjective criteria), small business incentives (to encourage the use of small 
businesses), the generation of past performance reports (a non-monetary incentive which 
can benefit the contractor when competing for future contracts by showing previous 
positive performance), vendor awards/letters of commendation, non-performance 
remedies, and share-in-savings strategies (DOD, 2012; GSA, 2005). Non-monetary 
incentives, such as past performance reports, can be a very strong motivator for a 
contractor because these reports will have an effect on the contractor’s ability to be 
awarded future contracts. 
The DOD (2012) concludes their discussion on incentives by reminding 
acquisition professionals to tie incentives to the appropriate area, do not be afraid to 
communicate with potential vendors and stakeholders when designing incentives, ensure 
the incentive is attainable, and use the following questions to guide the construction of an 
incentive strategy: 
 Does the incentive support the mission, goals, and requirements? 
 Will the incentive result in value added?  
 Are there areas of the contract that could benefit the most from 
incentives?  
 Are there areas that don’t require incentives?  
 Is there a willingness-to-pay for the added performance the 
incentive will provide? 
 Is the incentive affordable?  
 Can the incentivized area be measured to ensure proper award/non-
award?  
 Can a cost-sharing strategy be implemented?     
 Will the incentive provide holistic positive effects?  
 Does the incentive structure benefit both the buyer and the seller?  
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 Does that contractor have total performance control over the 
incentivized area? (DOD, 2012, p. 40).  
2. Award Phase  
The award phase, per NCMA (2017) and Garrett (2010), includes everything 
required to award a contract. This includes evaluating offers, conducting negotiations, 
source selection, contract award, and debriefing offerors. Best business practices in the 
award phase cover any practice that guides individual actions in the award phase. The 
award-phase is complete once a contract has been awarded. Recall step six, Execute 
Strategy, from the DOD (2016) 7 Steps to Service Acquisitions. This step includes source 
selection, contract award, and debriefing unsuccessful offerors. GSA (2005) describes 
source selection as the most critical and time intensive aspect of executing the strategy. 
Source selection consists of three main best practices, competing the solution, down-
selecting, and due-diligence. As such, these three aspects will be discussed individually 
and separate from contract award and debriefing.  
a. Competing the Solution 
Competing the solution is facilitated by utilizing a Performance Work Statement. 
For example, some believe a statement of work describing everything from manpower to 
techniques result in less risk of the contractor failing to perform, even when contracting 
for services (GSA, 2005). The GSA (2005) warns against this mentality and even notes 
that detailed descriptions of how to perform every task, in fact, increases the risk to the 
government. Such a statement of work will be strictly followed by the contractor, even 
when the contractor is well aware of a more efficient means of accomplishing the tasks. 
Furthermore, the contractor will continue to follow the statement of work even if they 
know that doing so conflicts with the desired outcome. The worst part of this scenario is 
that the detailed statement of work that lead to contract failure may be able to protect the 
contractor. A more successful approach is to clearly define the desired outcomes and 
allow vendors competing for the contract to provide their solutions, performance 
measures, and methodologies (GSA, 2005). Comparing each vendors’ solutions becomes 
a determining factor in source selection. Companies, such as Supplier Select (2017), have 
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built vendor comparison charts to aid the commercial marketplace in analyzing vendor 
solutions. The vendor comparison chart is based on weighted scoring results from each 
proposal and even allows the source selection team to visualize the effect of altering the 
weighted guidelines scheme (Supplier Select, 2017). The government also uses weighted 
evaluation criteria when reviewing proposals. Evaluation weights are assigned based on 
what end of the best-value continuum the source selection criteria fall, lowest price 
technically acceptable or highest technically rated offer (FAR, 2017).  
b. Down-Selecting  
Down-selecting is the process of narrowing the competitive range by eliminating 
proposals. The Mitre Corporation (2017) describes this as a “multi-step technique 
[allowing for] more manageable and efficient source selection” (para. 3). This method is 
popular because interested suppliers do not waste resources developing products or 
proposals for a requirement in which they are not competitive while the government is 
given the ability to better assess proposals within a competitive range (Mitre, 2017). The 
proposals being eliminated are selected based on a reasonable postulation of the 
unlikeliness of that vendor being awarded the contract (GSA, 2005). This may occur even 
in the absence of a detailed proposal analysis. The result of the down-select process is a 
smaller pool of highly qualified proposals. The IPT then commits their time, energy, and 
resources to a complete analysis of the newly established competitive range (GSA, 2005). 
In certain situations, a multiple award contract strategy may be used in order to obtain 
services from any of the highest qualified vendors throughout the contract life cycle 
without re-competing the entire contract.  
c. Due-Diligence  
The due-diligence process begins once the narrowed competitive range is 
established. However, the Contracting Officer may further reduce the competitive range 
to as few as would allow a suitable competition and evaluation (FAR, 2017). The due-
diligence step is designed to allow the offeror to become more knowledgeable about the 
agency’s needs rather than allow the government to become more knowledgeable about 
the proposals (GSA, 2005). The GSA (2005) emphasizes the need for the offerors to have 
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access to the IPT, and the due-diligence process is characterized by open communication 
that allows each offeror to provide their best solution proposal.  
d. Contract Award and Debriefing 
Contract award simply means that a source has been selected and appropriate 
signatures have been obtained to create a binding contract (GSA, 2005). This action must 
be publicized and protests may be filed. All protests must receive a determination from 
the appropriate agency prior to the start of contract performance.  
Debriefing, as directed by the FAR (2017), includes notifying offerors when they 
have been excluded from the competitive range. The FAR (2017) continues by explaining 
unsuccessful offerors have the right to the following information, sent to them in writing: 
(1) The number of offerors solicited  
(2) The number of proposals received 
(3) The name/address of each offeror receiving an award  
(4) The items, quantities, and any stated unit prices of each award 
(5) In general terms, the reason(s) the offeror’s proposal was not accepted, 
unless the price information...readily reveals the reason (Part 15.503[b]).  
Therefore, a solid source selection plan is critical for preventing the sustainment 
of protests. Closely following a sound and logical source selection plan facilitates an 
expeditious generation of the notification letters and may help the government maintain 
the public trust.  
3. Post-Award Phase  
The post-award phase begins when the award phase ends. Tasks in the post-award 
phase include monitoring compliance of the terms and conditions, addressing any issues 
during contract performance, executing contract modifications, making payments, and 
contract closeout/termination (Garrett, 2010; NCMA, 2017). The post-award phase ends 
when the contract has been successfully closed or terminated (Garrett, 2010). Recall step 
seven, Manage Performance, from 7 Steps to Service Acquisitions (DOD, 2016). This 
 25 
step outlines common post-award best business practices in both government and 
commercial acquisition. This step includes transitioning to performance management, 
administering the contract, managing performance results, and documenting lessons 
learned (GSA, 2005).  
a. Transitioning to Performance Management  
GSA (2005) explains that the transition from acquisition to performance 
management is a critical function and, if done correctly, will ensure the contractor 
delivers services within the terms and conditions of the contract. The three most 
important aspects to accomplish this transition is maintaining team integrity, using 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR) to evaluate contractor performance, and 
bringing the contractor into the IPT (GSA, 2005). Maintaining team integrity provides the 
best chance of facilitating a successful transition to performance management because the 
IPT members who managed the acquisition are the most knowledgeable about the 
contract requirements (GSA, 2005). The United States Army (2002) illustrates how 
CORs, when given appropriate roles and responsibilities, serve as the government’s 
front-line of defense. The COR is the government representative evaluating the 
contractor’s performance. Early indications of underperformance can be identified by the 
COR and may prevent contract failure. Additionally, COR evaluations provide the 
contractor with the feedback they need to make process corrections and establish or 
reinforce best business practices (United States Army [USA], 2002). Lastly, as explained 
by DOD (2012), the contractor should be welcomed to the IPT. The contractor is actually 
performing the work, therefore, open lines of communication between the IPT 
(requirements generators and stakeholders) and the contractor must be maintained in 
order to ensure contract success and customer satisfaction. Furthermore, it is in the best 
interest of all for the contractor to know immediately of any noted deficiencies in order to 
allow time for remediation (DOD, 2012).  
b. Administering the Contract  
DOD (2012) notes that administering the contract ensures accuracy and 
completion of billing, payments, and modifications. The contractor’s invoices should be 
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validated and costs should be tracked, when appropriate, prior to completing payments to 
the contractor. A plan should be generated that will facilitate data collection at the lowest 
level possible (DOD, 2012). The period of performance for services contracts often spans 
several years, therefore, it is safe to assume that changes to the original contract will 
occur. Changes in personnel will also be a fact of life during the contract period of 
performance. The Contracting Officer is the only government representative with the 
authority to modify the contract, therefore, appropriate controls must be in place in order 
to ensure the transfer of knowledge and authority as personnel changes (GSA, 2005).  
c. Managing Performance Results  
As mentioned above, the CORs will be the technical representatives measuring 
the contractor’s performance (USA, 2002). The performance measurement results should 
be used by the IPT to establish performance trends. Keeping track of performance trends 
provides a proactive approach to problem management and may prevent conflicts (DOD, 
2012). Systems, such as the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System 
(CPARS) and the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), are available 
for documenting, archiving, and retrieving performance information.  
Maintaining open communications with the contractor is critical for ensuring 
successful performance management (DOD, 2012). The contractor must be aware of how 
their service quality is viewed by the government. This can be accomplished by 
conducting frequent performance reviews with the contractor (GSA, 2005). According to 
Service Performance Incorporated, large projects should be reviewed quarterly, medium 
projects bi-annually, and small projects annually (Arlen, 2008). Complexity, level of risk, 
and the speed at which industry changes all affect the frequency of performance reviews 
(Arlen, 2008). It is not uncommon on complex or critical government contracts for 
weekly performance reviews to occur, especially in the early stages of contract 
performance. GSA (2005) cautions that one should ensure discussions are based on 
factual data obtained from objective measurable metrics. If objective metrics are 
nonexistent, sufficient reasonable support must be provided to validate the subjective 
view (GSA, 2005). Performance reviews also help to keep the contract on course and 
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facilitate the appropriate modifications (GSA, 2005). It is always prudent to ask the 
contractor if the government is levying any requirements that impede their ability to 
perform at cost, on schedule, and with the required quality (DOD, 2012).  
d. Documenting Lessons Learned  
Lastly, lessons learned should be documented and a plan to achieve continuous 
improvement should be developed. Many of the services the government contracts for are 
duplicative, either in other agencies or from year to year. Maintaining succinct and 
effective lessons learned facilitates process improvement for both the buyer (government) 
and the seller (contractor). It is imperative to document the strategies used and the level 
of success achieved implementing the aforementioned strategies in the lessons learned. 
Continuous process improvement should be a goal in all service acquisitions, especially 
with a long-term period of performance (DOD, 2012). Process improvement can be 
realized by actions from both the government side and the contractor side, therefore, the 
process improvement efforts should be collaborative.   
C. ENCOURAGING INNOVATION  
Innovation, as defined by Merriam-Webster (2017), is “the introduction of 
something new.” This report provides a more specific definition. Innovation in FSC is the 
introduction of any new, new to the organization, or cutting edge processes, techniques, 
or technology with the goal of reducing cost, increasing quality, or increasing efficiency. 
In order for innovation in government contracting to be successful, four objectives must 
be attained (Brown, 2014). First, the innovative solution must protect the taxpayer from 
fraud and abuse. Secondly, the innovative solution must prevent government corruption. 
Third, the innovative solution must allow the government to take advantage of scale and 
efficiency. Fourth, the innovative solution must prevent supplier discrimination (Brown, 
2014). Strategies to encourage innovation are presented within the three phases of the 
contract life cycle, as detailed in The Contract Management Standard (NCMA, Version 
1.0, n.d.)  and World Class Contracting (Garrett, 2010). 
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1. Pre-Award Phase  
The pre-award phase definition, used in Section B, still applies (Garrett, 2010; 
NCMA, Version 1.0, n.d.). The subsections below provide relevant pre-award phase 
strategies to encourage innovation. Again, as stated in Section B, the pre-award phase 
ends with the release of an RFP (Garrett, 2010).  
a. Release a Problem Statement Before Releasing an RFP 
Release a problem statement and allow potential bidders to compete the solution 
(Brown, 2014). Brown (2014) goes as far to suggest abandoning the use of an RFP 
altogether and describes it as arcane. Whether an RFP is used or not, however, is 
irrelevant when considering the use of a problem statement because the problem 
statement can precede the release of an RFP. Similar processes of releasing requests that 
precede the official RFP already exist in federal contracting; three of these documents are 
Requests for Information (RFI), Sources Sought Notices (SSN), and a Statement of 
Objectives (SOO) accompanying the RFP. Additionally, a draft RFP may be submitted to 
solicit responses without incurring an obligation to purchase (FAR, 2017). The difference 
though, is an RFI is typically seeking broad data and understanding (Mhay & Coburn, 
2008) and a SSN is used to determine marketplace interest (Schadl, 2017). The SOO is 
the most similar to a problem statement; however, it is typically more detailed (up to 4-
pages long) and used to address product-oriented goals (Naval Air Warfare Center 
[NAVAIR], 2013). A SOO can be easily modified, however, to mimic a problem 
statement. Brown (2014) describes the problem statement as being written in as general 
of terms as possible because broadly describing an issue frees the potential offeror from 
the confines of uninformed thinking and encourages innovative thought and creativity. 
Additionally, a problem statement may get companies interested in the potential 
solicitation and help them submit their best proposal (Brown, 2014). For example, the 
problem statement might say, “The main sidewalk near the base exchange accumulates 
litter.” You may receive solutions from vendors looking to provide personnel to pick up 
trash on the sidewalk and bring it to a proper disposal area; you may have vendors 
proposing the installation of additional trashcans, or even a vendor that has an 
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autonomous robot capable of retrieving garbage. Solutions to this problem are only 
restricted by imagination. In contrast, a SOW/SOO/PWS stating, “We need a sidewalk 
sweeper and an operator to keep the exchange sidewalk clean” provides strict limitations 
on contractor creativity.  
b. Private-Sector Advisors  
FAR 10.002(b)(2)(i) (2016) already promotes contacting government and industry 
experts to identify market capabilities. What many do not realize, however, is that 
researching market capabilities is not just figuring out what you can buy and where to 
buy it, but includes the unique innovative solutions and processes common in the 
commercial marketplace. In the commercial marketplace, this is more commonly known 
as researching your competitors (Dahl, 2011). There was a time when all the best 
technology and management concepts originated in the government, however, that age 
has passed (Brown, 2014). The modern prudent approach is to reach out to private-sector 
experts or businesses to identify current capabilities, as instructed in FAR part 10 (2016), 
as well as researching and communicating with businesses that have solved the same 
problem and ask them or discover how they achieved efficiency, quality, innovation, and 
effectiveness (Dahl, 2011). Simple questions such as, “How do you solve this problem” 
or “What exactly is cutting edge” can be invaluable sources of information (Brown, 
2014). Expert advice aids the procurement team in identifying processes and technology 
that they may not have been privy too. Furthermore, the requirements generators benefit 
from this type of market research because it gives them a better understanding of what to 
ask for and what is possible (Brown, 2014).  
The Department of Treasury and Finance (DOTF) for Australia’s Victorian 
Government also supports contacting private-sector experts for procurement advice 
(Australia Department of Treasury [ADT], 2012). Businesses must continually evolve 
and improve in order to stay alive in the competitive marketplace, government does not. 
It is only natural for competitive companies to seek and adopt innovative solutions more 
expeditiously than their government counterparts (ADT, 2012). The wealth of knowledge 
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in the competitive marketplace should be harvested through effective communications 
prior to releasing the RFP.    
c. Offeror Developed PWS  
Utilizing a PWS, prepared by the government, or a SOO in conjunction with an 
RFP vice a SOW is already a step in the right direction for encouraging innovation. The 
optimum approach for encouraging innovation is for the government to release a SOO as 
part of the solicitation and allow the offerors to respond with their own developed PWS 
as part of their proposal. This gives the offeror the maximum latitude for determining 
how to complete the work. A less optimum solution, but better than a SOW, is for the 
government to release a PWS as part of the solicitation and the offerors respond with that 
same PWS in their proposal. However, an overtly strict and restrictive PWS leaves no 
room for flexibility and deters potential offerors from submitting a bid (Brown, 2014). 
FSCs often span several years, therefore, one can guarantee a new technology or best 
practice improving the service will be invented. Using and developing such practices or 
technology is encouraged when performance restrictions are reduced. Conversely, as 
pointed out by Brown (2014), a strict PWS, prepared by the government, does not 
account for the exponentially increasing pace at which technology and processes are 
created and may stifle the supplier’s ability to propose their best solution. Encourage 
innovation by erring on the side of less details versus more details in order to maintain 
flexibility throughout the contract life cycle (Brown, 2014).   
d. Incentives 
In order to promote a desired behavior one must provide an incentive. This truth 
remains standard from the earliest point in life and endures throughout. Therefore, if the 
desired behavior is to encourage innovative thinking and performance above and beyond 
the base requirement, then an incentive must be provided. The most common incentive is 
money, either in the form of additional payments in the period of performance or 
awarding additional contracts to the vendor. Both of these avenues of encouraging 
innovation are great places to start. In order to create successful incentives, the IPT must 
establish target performance standards above the base requirement and assign incentives 
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that reward the contractor for achieving the incentive standard (Costello, 1997). As 
mentioned above, however, it was found in 2009 that over 93% of military service 
contracts were not using incentives, even though doing so is recommended by 
government acquisition regulations (Rendon et al. 2012). This fact makes it unsurprising 
that innovative solutions are not commonplace in FSCs.  
It is no secret that every private company is profit motivated, however, the 
procurement team must think outside the box. Money is not the only incentive. Take the 
time to speak with potential suppliers during market research and get an idea of what that 
vendor truly values (Robbins, 2015). Value can be found in surprising areas if you just 
look. Some of the most innovative companies incentivize innovation by simply providing 
employees with the time to be creative and think of solutions (Kessenger, 2015).  
2. Award Phase 
The award phase definition, used in Section B, still applies (Garrett, 2010; 
NCMA, Version 1.0, n.d.). The subsections below provide relevant award phase 
strategies to encourage innovation. Again, as stated in Section B, the award phase 
concludes when a formal contract is awarded (Garrett, 2010).  
a. Terms and Conditions: A Collaborative Approach  
Allow the contractor to partake in creating the contract terms and conditions in 
order to create risk-sharing initiatives (Brown, 2014). This will also serve as a process to 
identify how each party can solve the other’s perceived issues before contract 
performance begins. Sharing costs and sharing savings is the most common way to share 
risks (ADT, 2012). This is already common practice with both cost-reimbursable and 
fixed-price contracts and is known as the share ratio. In this instance, the government 
identifies a target cost, establishes percentages detailing how much of an overrun the 
government will pay for, establishes percentages detailing how much of an underrun the 
government will share with the contractor, and sets a point of total assumption in which 
the contractor is fully liable for any additional costs (Antonio, 2003). For example, a 
50/50 share ratio would mean the government and contractor would split the added 
expense of surpassing the target or split the savings for staying below the target. 
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Additionally, the government can establish a point of total assumption in which any cost 
incurred beyond the threshold is the sole responsibility of the contractor. Bringing the 
contractor into the share ratio decision process helps ensure a ratio that is agreeable to 
both parties. Lastly, a collaborative terms and conditions process helps foster an 
integrative relationship in which greater value is created and shared instead a distributive 
relationship with a fixed value in which one party wins while the other loses (Mehta, 
2012). Integrative relationships tend to provide both parties with more value that either 
would receive in a distributive relationship (Mehta, 2012).   
3. Post-Award Phase  
The post-award phase definition, used in Section B, still applies (Garrett, 2010; 
NCMA, Version 1.0, n.d.). The subsections below provide relevant post-award phase 
strategies to encourage innovation. The post-award phase ends when the contract has 
been successfully closed or terminated (Garrett, 2010). 
a. Create a Culture of Innovation 
Do not penalize the contractor for a failed innovative solution (The Young 
Entrepreneur Council [TYEC], 2015). In my opinion, this is the most common way to 
stifle innovation. The contractor is always focused on the bottom line (cash flow and 
profit). Any behavior that could jeopardize the bottom line creates a disproportionate 
risk-reward scenario, meaning the contractor is not going to take unnecessary risks. It is 
critical to understand that innovation is synonymous with risk (McCann Health, 2016). 
New ideas, technology, and processes have a higher failure rate than well documented 
and proven methods, however, “smart companies are built in a way that allow for failure” 
(TYEC, 2015, para. 5). Failure must be accepted, if not encouraged, when innovation is 
desired. Facebook has a relevant motto that could benefit government contracting, “Move 
fast and break stuff” (Abbruzzese, 2016, para. 1). This is a clever adaptation of the 
popular military adage, “It’s easier to ask for forgiveness than it is to ask for permission.” 
Simply put, encourage the rapid implementation of innovative thought without complex 
approval processes or fear of aggressive reprimand (TYEC, 2015).  
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b. Make Innovation a Competition  
Most individuals enjoy competing and this is especially true with service 
members, therefore, make innovation a competition. The Department of Health and 
Human Services is already doing this; they have created a Shark Tank style format for 
employees to pitch their ideas to senior leaders (Rathi, 2014). Rathi cautions, however, 
that to make the competition successful you must do the following four things: 
1. Be as specific as possible about what competitors are trying to do without 
limiting the manner in which success is achieved. Do not just say, “be 
innovative” or “create a new process to save us money” but establish 
metrics and goals to achieve.  
2. Break up the challenge into manageable tasks, such as only requiring a 
one page pitch before asking for a large time commitment or detailed plan. 
This will encourage more participants to join the effort.   
3. Provide resources and internal mentors to guide competitors through the 
process.  
4. Understand that value is gained even in the absence of results. Service 
members and employees will learn new skills, foster cross-organizational 
communication, and stimulate a creative environment. (Rathi, 2014, para. 
4-9)  
I believe that to make competing more worthwhile for Marines an award must 
carry some weight. For example, the higher the rank of the person signing the award the 
better. Awards can have huge positive impacts on a service member’s or a government 
employee’s motivation, retainability, accelerated promotion potential, and job 
satisfaction. Awards given to contractors provide a boost to their past performance 
history which aids in being awarded future contracts, especially if innovative past 
performance is an evaluation criteria during contract source selection. I contend that 
creating an award is arguably the easiest, most effective, and least costly method of 
obtaining results. Recognizing and rewarding creativity is also supported by The Young 
Entrepreneur Council (2015) and listed as one of their top 18 ways to encourage 
innovation.  
 34 
D. CURRENT USMC FSC PROCESSES  
I was unable to obtain full contract files for any USMC FSC. However, contract 
documents detailing the pre-award phase processes as well as limited award and post-
award phase processes were available on the government-wide point of entry. These 
documents were reviewed in order to characterize the current contracting processes in 
this section. Navy Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) provides unified 
processes and management of contracts, but rely on partnership with the installations they 
serve. Of note, Headquarters Marine Corps, Installation and Logistics (I&L) describes the 
Marine Corps participation in this process as ad hoc.  
1. Pre-Award Phase  
Pre-solicitation SSNs were publicized to determine the scale in which the small 
business sector could be relied upon for services. Vendors qualifying under the “Small 
Business Set Aside Program,” such as “Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small 
Business,” “Women Owned Small Business,” and “Historically Underutilized Business 
Zone” were encouraged to submit proposals (Small Business Administration, n.d.). When 
sufficient responses from the small business sector were received, the entire contract was 
designated as a small business set aside. The solicitation type was a negotiated RFP vice 
sealed bid.       
FSC solicitations use an indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract 
with two base FFP CLINs, four option years, and five award terms. An award term plan 
was not available to the author; therefore, this project does not analyze evaluation criteria 
or methods for administering the award term. The first CLIN represents dozens of 
predetermined recurring and preventative maintenance tasks. The second CLIN 
represents a FFP IQ of unexpected or emergency work throughout the period of 
performance.   
A PWS, vice a SOW, was used in the solicitation to describe the desired results. 
However, the PWS was accompanied by a fairly detailed work schedule. The schedule 
outlined what the contractor was required to do, when to do it, where to do it (down to the 
square foot in some instances), how to operate safely, and in some instances detailed how 
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the job would be conducted. For example, in one case the contractor was instructed to 
clear debris three feet from the edge of the asphalt when cleaning the jogging trail. 
Worklists were also provided detailing how specific work would be completed for some 
tasks. One such worklists provided a 21-step process on how to check unpaved roads and 
tank trails.   
2. Award Phase  
The trade-off source selection method was utilized rather than the lowest price 
technically acceptable method. Best value was determined using the tradeoff process 
between price and five non-price technical factors. Price was the most heavily weighted 
evaluation criteria and was considered equal in weight to the five evaluated technical 
factors combined. Each technical factor was equal in weight. Price reasonableness was 
evaluated based on competition, independent government estimates, historical 
information, and market survey responses. Unrealistically low price proposals were 
considered unacceptable. The following identifies and describes each non-price technical 
factor:  
 Corporate Experience  
Each vendor was allowed to submit past performance on up to five performance-
based contracts within the previous three years. Past performance history was only 
evaluated if it was similar in scope, size, type, and complexity.   
 Technical Approach  
This technical factor was comprised of several plans. The offeror had to detail 
how they initially planned to provide the required support. This included work the 
contractor planned on performing as well as work the contractor planned to sub-contract 
out. If the offeror planned a joint venture, then details of this arrangement was required. 
The staffing plan supporting the FFP CLIN was required as well as the IQ CLIN staffing 
plan. A detailed plan for accomplishing the preventative maintenance, cyclic 
maintenance, and recurring work was required. A plan outlining how weight handling 
equipment would be inspected, load tested, and safely operated was required. Lastly, a 
plan for the management of government reimbursable direct materials was required.  
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 Management Plan  
The management plan was required to detail a transition plan, client relationship 
management plan, subcontract management plan, and organizational chart. The 
organizational chart had to detail key personnel, an employee retention plan, service call 
plan, work surge management, and quality control. The management plan also had to 
outline what equipment, materials, vehicles, and facilities (other than government 
furnished) the contractor deemed necessary for the performance of the contract. Lastly, 
contractors had the option to describe any unique or innovative approaches they planned 
to implement on the contract. Of note, contractors with a history of innovative 
performance received a higher rating.  
 Past Performance  
This technical factor was evaluated based on responses received from Past 
Performance Questionnaires filled out and submitted by the offerors’ previous clients. 
Questionnaires that were mailed or turned in by the offeror were not accepted. 
Additionally, the offeror was able to provide proof of any awards or recognition received 
in the previous three years. Performance history obtained through the Past Performance 
Information Retrieval System also made up the past performance factor.  
 Safety  
This technical factor required the offeror to submit a copy of their current 
worker’s compensation insurance plan and carrier, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) lost workday incident rate, OSHA recordable incident rate, 
safety awards received, and any federal, state, or municipal OSHA citations received. 
3. Post-Award Phase  
Performance evaluation meetings were utilized during the post-award phase. 
During the first two months of the period of performance the contractor and government 
representative met weekly. After two months, the meetings were held monthly or as 
needed. Contractor performance assessment reports were not available to the author. 
CORs were identified and appointed to observe and report on contractor performance.  
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a detailed breakdown of the laws and regulations that must 
be followed when the government contracts for services. The regulations were obtained 
by analyzing the FAR, DFARS, NMCARS, Circular A-76, and DoDI 5000.74. 
Establishing the regulatory environment provided the lens in which best business 
practices was viewed while researching. This chapter outlined some relevant and 
recurring best business practices documented in civilian and governmental publications, 
guides, magazines, and manuals throughout all phases of the contract life cycle. 
Following said best business practices will purportedly increase a contract manager’s 
ability to maintain efficient and legal contracting processes. Research conducted by 
Rendon (2015) assessed the U.S. Navy’s contracting processes using the Contract 
Management Maturity Model. This model provides a means to benchmark current 
processes and conduct a customized analysis to generate programs for process 
improvement. Rendon (2015) found that processes in the pre-award phase were 
structured and functioning, but lacked integration while processes in the award and post-
award phases were absent in some instances. The results of this research supported the 
need for a comparative analysis a continuous examination of processes. Additionally, this 
chapter presented strategies to encourage innovation throughout the contract life cycle. 
Encouraging innovation will aid in the government’s ability to achieve performance 
above the base requirement. Lastly, this chapter outlined the current processes and 
practices utilized in USMC FSC.  
The next chapter will discuss the research methodology. It will outline the data 
collection procedure and data analysis procedure. The next chapter will also discuss the 
assumptions made during the research and list all the limitations of this project.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE  
The order in which literature was collected and reviewed was laws and 
regulations, best business practices, innovative encouraging strategies, and USMC FSC 
documentation. Laws and regulations were reviewed first in order to establish the legal 
framework that confines government contracting. The FAR, DFARS, and NMCARS 
were obtained from the Air Force’s FAR Site. The Defense Contingency Contracting 
Handbook Version 5 was obtained from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics web portal. The DoDI 5000.74 was obtained 
from the Defense Technical Information Center. All regulations are available to the 
general public.  
Best business practices and strategies to encourage innovation were researched 
second in order to establish a baseline of common commercial and governmental best 
business practices. Best business practices were collected via open source and publicly 
available documents and text books. Sources included, but is not limited to, the Defense 
Acquisition University’s Defense Acquisition Portal, Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Harvard Business Review, The 
Young Entrepreneur Council, and RAND Corporation. Lastly USMC FSC documents 
were collected from the government wide point of entry. These documents were analyzed 
to determine the current processes and practices used in USMC FSC in preparation for 
the comparative analysis. 
B. DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE  
In order to organize and analyze the data, I utilized the contract life cycle 
framework provided by the NCMA and prominent contract management figure, Gregory 
A. Garrett. Garrett’s book World Class Contracting 5th Edition (2010) and NCMA’s The 
Contract Management Standard (Version 1.0, n.d.) describe three phases of the contract 
life cycle. The three phases are the pre-award, award, and post-award. These three phases 
of the contract life cycle are recognized and used by all Federal Government, DOD, and 
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military services. Organizing and analyzing the research in this manner enables a quick 
comparison between current processes and best practices. Additionally, this 
organizational method allows the reader to quickly find potential solutions depending on 
which phase of the contract life cycle they are working.   
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
 The contract files reviewed by the author are representative of all 
USMC FSCs. 
D. LIST OF LIMITATIONS  
 I was unable to review any complete FSC files, therefore, the 
comparative analysis outside of the pre-award phase of contracting 
is limited. 
 Recommendations for strategies, practices, and processes in the 
award and post-award phase of contracting may be redundant with 
current USMC FSC practices.   
E. SUMMARY  
This chapter detailed the process by which the author collected research 
(regulations, best practices, innovation strategies, current USMC processes). The manner 
in which the literature was analyzed was also described (contract life cycle phases). This 
chapter also provide the assumptions the author made during the literature review and 
identified the limitations restricting this study.   
The next chapter discusses the research questions posed by this project and 
provides answers based on the comparative analysis and literature review.  
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IV. FINDINGS  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions provided below served as the driving force for this project. 
These questions are timeless and appropriate for repeated study because of the pace at 
which the field of contracting evolves. Additionally, continuous process improvement, 
efficiency, and innovative solutions are the lifeblood of the Marine Corps and ingrained 
in every Marine’s mind. This chapter discusses the findings for each research question.  
1. What are the current practices and processes used for USMC facilities 
support contracting? 
An analysis of USMC FSC contract documents revealed that best business 
practices are generally followed. Furthermore, the author noted no instances in which 
processes contradicted regulations. Practices encouraging innovation were discovered, 
however, they are minimal and deal exclusively with source selection.   
Market research is conducted and even pre-solicitation sources sought notices 
have been released to determine the small business capabilities. Negotiated RFPs are 
used instead of sealed bidding because the contract award is based on both price and non-
price factors (pursuant to FAR 6.401, 2017). FSCs are awarded/administered using 
performance-based contracting methods. FFP task orders under an IDIQ are awarded. A 
PWS is used to describe the desired end-state instead of a SOW and the private market is 
relied upon for commercial services. However, worklists and work schedules 
accompanied the PWS and provided detailed descriptions of exactly how to accomplish 
certain tasks under the IDIQ (similar to a SOW).   
FSCs are awarded using the best-value evaluation method. Five non-price factors 
were evaluated, in addition to price. The non-price factors, when combined, are equal in 
weight to price. The assigned weight of each evaluation factor is supported by the FAR 
(2017); “in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly definable and the risk of 
unsuccessful contract performance in minimal, cost or price may play a dominant role in 
source selection” (Part 15.101). Of note, technical factor Management Plan provided the 
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contractor an opportunity to detail any plans for a unique and innovative solution for 
meeting the contract requirements. 
Lastly, CORs were identified and used to track the contractor’s performance. 
Weekly meetings were held during the first two months of the contract performance 
period. After two months, meetings were held monthly or as needed. I was unable to 
obtain or review any CPARs; however, all option years and award terms were executed. 
Therefore, I presume that the contractor’s performance continually met the standards 
established in the contract and warranted the award of all options and terms.  
2. What commercial and governmental best business practices can the 
USMC implement to improve the FSC process?  
The recommendations provided in the subsections below were the result of a 
comparative analysis. The analysis organized current USMC FSC processes and best 
business practices into the three phases of the contract life cycle, in order to detect 
similarities and differences (Garrett, 2010; NCMA, Version 1.0, n.d.). When a difference 
was identified, that practice was viewed through the lens of the regulatory framework 
established in Chapter II. If the practice remained within the confines of the regulatory 
framework, then it was included as a recommendation in this section.   
a. Use the IPT—Lead the IPT   
As a review, a properly functioning IPT identifies and consults all stakeholders 
and integrates the efforts of all involved toward a unified objective. A well-rounded IPT 
serves to properly define requirements, resolve problems, select the best course of action, 
analyze proposals, and inspect completed services (GSA, 2005). Each function demands 
dedicated Marine Corps involvement, however, HQMC I&L has described the Marine 
Corps’ participation in the FSC process as ad hoc. This is not indicative of a properly 
functioning IPT. Furthermore, project failure is commonly attributed to IPT members’ 
being prevented from dedicating their time to the project’s success; i.e., other job 
functions trump their IPT role (Calleam Consulting, 2017). This may explain the 
USMC’s ad hoc participation in the FSC process and may be a limiting factor to 
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performance maximization. Being an effective IPT member is a full-time job or at least a 
high-priority part of one’s job. 
Properly defining the requirement is the most critical function of the IPT. In fact, 
The International Project Leadership Academy dedicates an entire category of reasons 
projects fail to requirements issues (Calleam Consulting, 2017). Improperly defining the 
requirement sets the stage for inefficiency, poor quality, and contract failure. Therefore, 
properly defining the requirement is the most critical USMC task during the FSC process. 
The Marine Corps owns the requirement on all Marine Corps installation FSCs and is the 
end user of the services being procured. Getting the requirement defined correctly as well 
as keeping the contract effort focused on Marine Corps priorities is vital. For these 
reasons, I suggest appointing a Marine as the IPT Lead on all USMC FSCs. The IPT 
Lead establishes the unified objective and is ultimately responsible for the performance 
of the IPT (Hecker, 2000). A Marine IPT Lead has the ability to manage the efforts of the 
acquisition team and the contractors to ensure all actions are in the best interest of the 
Marine Corps.  
b. Create a Center of Excellence  
I will argue that the fastest way to improve performance is through continual 
review of successes and failures. This is common knowledge and is supported by the 
2003 Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA). SARA mandated the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy to establish a Center of Excellence for Service Contracting (House of 
Representatives, 2003). Since the inception of the Center of Excellence for Service 
Contracting, considerable contributions have been made to improve the acquisition of 
services including the DoDI 5000.74 (2016), a dedicated chapter on services acquisition 
in the DOD’s Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2012), and the Contracting Officer’s 
Community of Practice.  
The Marine Corps has an opportunity to replicate the large-scale successes, 
mentioned above, on a smaller scale focusing exclusively on solving Marine Corps 
specific issues. Furthermore, a Marine Corps Contracting Center of Excellence would 
facilitate cross-organizational communication and promote a proactive approach to 
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problem resolution. Collectively the community could solve problems and improve 
processes while mitigating the risk of repeated mistakes.   
c. Strategic Sourcing  
NAVFAC conducts regional acquisition planning, which suggests that strategic 
sourcing efforts are conducted. However, additional contract vehicles and strategies exist 
that could provide a more efficient and effective means of strategically sourcing facilities 
support services.  
One such strategy, created by the Air Force, is to first create a standard list of 
facilities support  services common on all Air Force installations (Weckerlein, 2013). 
Creating a standard support services requirement encompassing all Air Force installations 
enabled the Air Force to write and administer fewer BOS contracts rather that numerous 
individual BOS contracts. This changed the Air Force’s dynamic as a customer. Instead 
of acting like hundreds of small customers they became one large customer. The Air 
Force was able to reduce the supplier base, achieve efficiencies, leverage economies of 
scale, and increase service quality. In fact, the Air Force achieved $481.68 million in cost 
savings from FY11-FY16 over 11 projects (HQUSAF, 2017). The Marine Corps could 
use the Air Force’s list of standard services as a template for generating their own 
standard list of facilities support services common on every Marine Corps installation. 
This data would facilitate the Marine Corps ability to act as one large purchaser vice 
dozens of small purchasers.  
Another, potentially more economical, option is to use an existing government-
wide strategic sourcing contract vehicle. GSA has created such a vehicle and calls it the 
GSA Buildings and Maintenance Operations (BMO) contract (GSA, 2017). This contract 
vehicle is the first ever government-wide strategic sourcing solution to be designated 
best-in-class by the Office of Management and Budget (Ruwwe, 2016). GSA has 
identified all high-demand BMO services and combined these tasks under an open 
market, multiple-award, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity, government-wide contract 
vehicle with a five-year base period of performance and a five-year option period (GSA, 
2017). The BMO contract has both unrestricted and small business set aside programs 
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built in to ensure maximum vendor competition as well as aid individual agencies in 
achieving the congressionally mandated small business participation. Furthermore, 
products procured under this contract vehicle are required to meet all applicable 
environmental standards including recycled materials and products conforming to Safer 
Choice, Energy Star, BioPreferred, and Water Sense standards (GSA, 2017). The 
following services can be acquired under the GSA BMO contract:  
 HVAC Maintenance  
 Plumbing and Pipefitting  
 Elevator Maintenance  
 Electrical Maintenance  
 Fire Alarm System Maintenance and Repair  
 Fire Suppression (Water Based) System Preventative Maintenance 
and Repair 
 Roofing Services  
 Building Management Services  
 Architectural and Framework Building Maintenance Services 
 Commissioning Services  
 Elevator Inspection Services  
 Janitorial  
 Landscaping/Grounds Maintenance  
 Pest Control  
 Waste Management and Recycling Services. (GSA, 2017, 
“Contract Scope”)  
GSA has designated six zones representing regions in which offerors may 
compete and operate. These zones encapsulate many Marine Corps installations, 
including Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Marine Corps Base Quantico. These 
bases are supported by Zone 3, Zone 5, and Zone 1, respectively. The GSA BMO 
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contract went live in Zone 1 in FY16 and GSA plans to bring all other zones online 
during FY17 (GSA, 2017). 
In order to use the GSA BMO contract, an Ordering Contracting Officer is 
required to complete GSA’s Request Delegation of Procurement Authority Training. 
GSA will issue a Delegation of Procurement Authority to any warranted Federal 
Government Contracting Officer upon completion of the training. This gives the 
Contracting Officer the ability to issue task order solicitations and award the task order. 
Additionally, GSA provides scope reviews to Contracting Officer’s writing task orders to 
minimize protests (GSA, 2017). A comprehensive ordering guide is available via the 
GSA website.  
d. Use the Taxonomy to Help Forecast  
Assad (2012) authorized the Taxonomy for the Acquisition of Services to be used 
within the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) in order to organize and track 
expenditures for services, supplies, and equipment. In accordance with Better Buying 
Power initiatives, taxonomy data retrieved from FPDS is used as a decision tool for 
strategic sourcing decisions and strategic workforce planning (Assad, 2012). However, 
the DOD is struggling to comply with legislation mandating the use of the taxonomy to 
support management decisions (DiNapoli, 2014). The USMC must address this shortfall 
in order to improve the quality, accuracy, and foresight of current services contracting 
forecasts. The taxonomy will enable the USMC to forecast further than one FY in the 
future while maintaining the integrity that single-year forecasts provide.  
The Convention of Biological Diversity asks a profound cross-occupation 
question that supports the use of a taxonomy, “How do decision-makers decide where to 
establish protected areas if they do not know what is being protected?” (Convention of 
Biological Diversity, 2007, para. 1). The question posed above highlights a major 
problem during a Program Objective Memorandum cycle or any budget generation 
process. In budget terms the Convention of Biological Diversity may ask, “How do 
Marine Corps financial planners know which programs need to be protected, expanded, 
or reduced when the true status of such programs remains indiscernible?” Properly using 
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the taxonomy for the acquisition of services would not only allow the USMC to comply 
with legislation but would also give the Marine Corps a mature holistic capability for 
planning and forecasting beyond the next fiscal year. Accurate forecasting would then 
provide the USMC with the ability to make educated cuts and realignments and support 
the USMC’s goal of becoming a lighter, faster, and more efficient force. Furthermore, 
data obtained through the proper use of the taxonomy for acquisition of services acts as a 
protection method to ensure the government does not become overly reliant on 
contractors (DINAPOLI, 2014). The USMC cannot afford to lose self-sufficiency; 
however, improper use of the taxonomy may lead down that road.  
e. Use the Contract Management Maturity Model for Process 
Benchmarking and Analysis  
Rendon (2015) designed the Contract Management Maturity Model to give 
organizations the capability of benchmarking the maturity of their contract management 
processes. Benchmarking facilitates the ability to analyze and assess processes in order to 
develop performance improvement programs (Rendon, 2015). Rendon (2015) used this 
model to create an assessment on U.S. Navy contracting processes, of which Marine 
Corps FSC are included. He found that processes in the pre-award phase were structured 
and functioning, but lacked integration and optimization throughout the organization. 
Furthermore, Rendon noted a decrease in maturity from the pre-award phase to the post-
award phase. In the award and post-award phases, contract management processes were 
less capable in some instances. The Contract Management Maturity Model should be 
used to benchmark USMC FSC contract processes. Doing so would allow for the creation 
of tailored solutions. These custom solutions would provide the most efficient means for 
improvement.   
3. What strategies and practices can the USMC implement to encourage 
innovation in FSCs?  
The recommendations provided in the subsections below were the result of a 
comparative analysis. The analysis organized current USMC FSC processes and 
strategies to encourage innovation into the three phases of the contract life cycle, in order 
to detect similarities and differences (Garrett, 2010; NCMA, Version 1.0, n.d.). When a 
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difference was identified, that strategy was viewed through the lens of the regulatory 
framework established in Chapter II. If the strategy to encourage innovation remained 
within the confines of the regulatory framework, then it was included as a 
recommendation in this section.   
f. Leave Room for the Contractor to be Innovative 
Encouraging the contractor to be innovative is only possible if the latitude to be 
innovative is provided. The tighter the contract restrictions are, the less room the 
contractor has to be innovative. This is part of the reason that the performance based 
acquisition method requires the use of a PWS vice a SOW (FAR, 2015). Currently the 
suboptimal approach discussed in Chapter II is used. The PWS is generated by the 
government and released as part of the solicitation. Again, to optimize this process a SOO 
should be released as part of the solicitation and allow the contractor develop the PWS as 
part of their proposal. The troubling issue, however, is the government generated PWS is 
accompanied by work schedules and worklists containing detailed instructions for how 
the contractor is required to complete certain tasks. In one instance a seven-step work list 
is provided detailing the task of jogging trail debris removal. One of the jogging trail 
debris removal steps instructs the contractor to remove debris at least three feet away 
from the edge of the asphalt to prevent debris buildup. On the surface, this may seem like 
a good idea, however a service task with this level of specificity creates a box in which 
the contractor will conform and charge for. This affects the proposal prices and does not 
allow the contractor to determine the most efficient way to prevent debris buildup. 
Furthermore, I found no study validating the use of the three-foot debris perimeter or its 
effectiveness. Therefore, one may even hypothesize that an unnecessary or arbitrary 
service is being procured (i.e., labor hours to ensure the three-foot perimeter). The 
legitimacy that removing such a seemingly insignificant task would result in any real 
savings may be criticized, however, even achieving a 0.1% efficiency would save 
$450,000 annually, based on the total USMC FSC annual spend (Office of the Secretary 
of the Navy, 2015). Pursuing smaller savings, known as incremental changes, is also 
supported by the commercial market (Coyne K., Coyne S., & Coyne Sr., E.J., 2010). 
When incremental changes are combined, the cost reductions of most departments equate 
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to 10% (Coyne et al., 2010). Secondly, there is rarely a single idea that would achieve 
cost-cutting goals (Coyne et al., 2010). It is the seemingly insignificant changes that add 
up to large savings.  
As detailed by Brown (2014), another method that provides the contractor with 
room to be innovative is the use of pre-solicitation problem statements. This method 
entails the release of a generalized problem description for a potential contract effort. 
Interested vendors respond to the problem statement with solutions to the stated problem. 
The solutions, received from the vendors, can then be used to help define, refine, and 
specialize the government’s requirement (Brown, 2014). Using a problem statement is a 
low-cost way to learn about new technology and processes without requiring the 
government to make any commitments. Furthermore, it allows the contractor to get an 
idea of potential contract efforts and dedicate time toward creating efficient and 
innovative solutions. Simply using a problem statement also sends the message to 
industry that the government values innovative solutions. Such a message may encourage 
vendors that typically shy away from government contracts to submit an idea or even a 
proposal which ultimately leads to better competition. As mentioned in Chapter II, a SOO 
as part of the solicitation can be written in more generalized terms, which allow it to 
mimic a problem statement.  
USMC FSCs contain a technical factor named, Management Plan. The 
management plan has a section in which offerors may submit any unique or innovative 
solution they would implement, if awarded the contract. Although this is similar to 
releasing a problem statement, the result is suboptimal. Submitting a FSC bid already 
requires offerors to generate proposals, under a time constraint, that are hundreds of 
pages long and creating a unique innovative solution adds to the complexity of their 
proposal generation. This makes the process for submitting an innovative solution too 
complex (TYEC, 2015). Offerors will invest more time and energy into creating 
defendable and competitive proposals. Herein lies the strength of the pre-solicitation 
problem statement. Respondents’ focus is on innovation, not proposal generation, which 
will increase the quantity and quality of the innovative solutions proposed.  
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g. Use Private-Sector Advisors to Get Smart  
Ill-defined requirements are often blamed for contract failure and become the star 
of many case studies. One such example was the FBI’s project Trilogy in which an ill-
defined requirement resulted in an unproductive $170 million disaster (Nelson, 2007). 
Communication with, or even hiring, a private sector expert prior to releasing a 
solicitation helps mitigate the risk of an ill-defined requirement because the private sector 
expert will have a better understanding of the current technology and best practices 
(Brown, 2014). Consider even hiring a private sector advisor to aid in the requirement 
generation process. Doing so is common government acquisition practice, especially in 
technologically intensive projects. However, it would seem that contract managers may 
underestimate the value of researching advancements in technology or practices for 
commercial services with low technology and education requirements. Underestimating 
the private market’s drive and ability to streamline and innovate seemingly mundane 
tasks will nearly ensure the selection of a suboptimal solution. Expert consultants have 
immense experience and are privy to technology and practices the common contract 
manager is not. The cost of the consultant’s time may be recouped many times over if 
they help the requirement generators ask for the right service rather than award a contract 
for an ill-defined requirement. The end result is a less expensive contract, happier 
contractor, and happier customers. Therefore, a concerted effort to obtain the private 
sector knowledge is critical for successful FSC efforts.  
Obtaining private sector knowledge must be accomplished while conducting 
market research. A simple phone call to a large organization’s contracting department can 
yield free information on how that company contracts for their services (Brown, 2014). 
Contract managers typically have no quarrels with releasing non-proprietary information 
to a non-competitor. This may result in the discovery of pitfalls to avoid or even yield 
potential solutions the IPT did not identify.  
h. Incentives, Incentives, Incentives 
The USMC is using a type of incentive known as the Award Term. This type of 
incentive is designed to reward a contractor, meeting the performance requirements set 
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forth in the Award Term Plan, with non-competitive contract awards beyond the option 
years (Rogin, 2002). I did not have access to any USMC FSC award term plans, 
therefore, assessing whether the plan encouraged innovation or not was impossible. 
However, no incentive structure encouraging innovation was outlined in any of the FSC 
documents reviewed. This is unsurprising, as mentioned in Chapter II, because a 2008–
2009 survey consisting of 300 collective responses from the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
found that just over 93 percent of service acquisitions did not incorporate incentives 
(Rendon et al. 2012). Incentives encouraging innovation must be created in order to 
promote innovative solutions. When designing incentives, it is prudent to recall the 
Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services questionnaire guide, listed in Chapter II, to aid 
in properly structuring incentives (DOD, 2012). Properly structured incentives reward 
both the government (in terms of increased quality or reduced lead-time) and the 
contractor (in terms of additional money or contracts) while poorly structured incentives 
may result in monetary gain for the contractor but no added value to the government 
(DOD, 2012). 
Kessenger (2015) notes, not all incentives are directly tied to a cash payout. Some 
of the most innovative companies incentivize innovation by simply providing employees 
with the time to be creative and think of solutions (Kessenger, 2015). This same tactic 
can be used in government contracting by establishing innovation time as part of the 
service being provided. Innovation time will not always result in viable solutions; 
however, employees are typically bursting with ideas on how they could improve their 
jobs. The problem though, is they are rarely given the time or authority to change the 
process.  
Another no cost incentive-based strategy to encourage innovation is assessing past 
and current innovative performance as well as proposed future innovative solutions 
(Dulkeith & Schepurek, 2013). USMC FSCs contain a technical factor named, 
Management Plan. The management plan has a section in which offerors may submit any 
unique or innovative plans they would implement, if awarded the contract. Evaluating 
innovative solutions, however, is merely a fraction of the management plan. If one 
considers price plus non-price factors to equal 100 percent, then the management plan, as 
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a whole, is only worth 10 percent of the total weight (based on current USMC FSC 
evaluation weights). This means that the innovative solution section is only worth a 
fraction of the 10 percent assigned to the management plan evaluation factor. Submitting 
a FSC bid already requires contractors to generate proposals, under a time constraint, that 
are hundreds of pages long. Creating a unique innovative solution improves the chance of 
a contract award only a fraction of the 10 percent assigned to the Management Plan 
evaluation factor; therefore, contractors have little incentive to invest a lot of time into 
generating an innovative solution. Contractors will invest more time and energy into 
creating defendable and competitive proposals because the process for submitting their 
innovative solution is too complex (TYEC, 2015).  
Past innovative performance and planned future innovative ideas should be a 
standalone proposal evaluation factor and weighted heavier than they are on current 
FSCs. Furthermore, if the goal is to encourage and improve innovative solution 
generation then the contractor’s performance in these areas should be part of the COR’s 
evaluation (Dulkeith & Schepurek, 2013). Peter Drucker is credited with saying, “What 
gets measured gets managed” (Prusak, 2010, para. 6). This clearly and simply describes 
how contractors will dedicate their time to what matters most, in effect, the most heavily 
weighted, monitored, and scrutinized areas. A popular method for measuring 
performance is utilizing the balanced scorecard (Balanced Scorecard Institute [BSI], 
2017). The BSI (2017) describes the balanced scorecard approach as being a structured 
planning and management system. The management system includes the creation and 
continual measurement of key performance indicators to track progress toward stated 
goals, measure accomplishments, focus employees’ efforts, and reduce uncertainties 
(BSI, 2017). However, according to Dulkeith and Schepurek (2013), the balanced 
scorecard is an incomplete framework for measuring innovative performance. Dulkeith 
and Schepurek recommend measuring and assessing innovative strategy, inputs, culture 
and structure, idea and knowledge management, innovation process, outputs, and 
outcomes. This provides a more holistic view on the progress of innovation and should be 
the model used in developing innovating performance evaluation criteria on the QASP.  
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i. Culture of Innovation 
The government is widely recognized as a no-nonsense and risk-averse 
organization with little appetite for failure. This is also apparent in government 
contracting. Contractors are penalized, either by a monetary fine or through termination 
of the contract, if they fail to meet the contract performance requirements. Additionally, 
government contract managers are punished for contracting failures via poor performance 
evaluations and a reduced ability to promote. TYEC (2015) recommends not punishing 
employees [and contractors] for failure. This stifles innovation and is not a new concept 
in the commercial marketplace. “Failure is a prerequisite to success” (Farson & Keyes, 
2002, para. 1). This is not to say that all failure should be accepted, but rather focus 
penalties on inaction vice failure (Barba, 2015). The USMC must adopt these concepts to 
maximize the potential for innovative solutions.  
The government operates in a slightly different business environment than the 
commercial marketplace because government innovation is bound by four unique 
objectives of successful contracting, as explained in Chapter II (Brown, 2014). These 
objectives can be met through proper risk mitigation. Farson and Keyes (2002) identify 
strategies to reduce innovative risk, such as creating abandonment points for new 
processes that are failing or a simultaneous launch of similar solutions to a common 
problem. The USMC can adopt modified commercial risk mitigation strategies; for 
example, using members of the IPT as the sounding board and approval authority for the 
implementation of innovative ideas. Cost of failure can be determined and mutual 
agreement between the contractor and the government can be obtained before 
implementing any new process or technology, similar to the way Value Engineering 
Change Proposals are used on some government contracts (FAR, 2017). Once an 
innovative solution is approved, the contractor should not suffer monetary loss or be 
hindered from obtaining future contracts if the solution ends in failure, unless failure 
stems from a lack of contractor effort (Barba, 2015).   
Another way to create an innovative culture and promote widespread participation 
is to mirror the Department of Health and Human Services and make innovation a 
competition among contractors, service members, and government employees (Rathi, 
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2014). To make the competition effective participants must be recognized and rewarded 
for their efforts (TYEC, 2015). This can be facilitated by creating an award, signed by the 
highest-ranking member possible, for the successful implementation of an innovative 
idea. The higher the rank of the individual that signs the award, the more coveted that 
award will be and the more weight that award will carry toward promotion, retention, and 
morale. This no-cost solution will aid in generating a dedicated effort toward finding 
innovative solutions to FSC processes. As stated in Chapter II, I believe the use of awards 
is the easiest, most effective, and least costly method of obtaining results.    
B. SUMMARY  
This chapter presented the findings from the comparative analysis and provided 
recommended courses of actions, in accordance with the project’s research questions. 
Current USMC FSC practices were outlined, four recommendations were provided to 
improve current FSC processes, and four recommendations to encourage innovation in 
FSCs were presented. Arguments supporting each recommendation were also discussed 
as well as documented research supporting their validity.  
The next chapter will provide a brief description of the research and provide a 
conclusion. Additionally, considerations that should be understood and discussed prior to 
encouraging innovation are detailed. Lastly, areas requiring further research to advance 
the USMC FSC process are presented. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The overarching goal of this research was to provide relevant recommendations to 
improve the USMC FSC process and encourage innovation. All recommendations 
remained within the confines of government procurement laws and regulations. 
Additionally, process improvements that would require a significant monetary investment 
or increase in personnel were omitted. Chapter I provided the background behind the 
creation of this project. Chapter II provided the literature review and served as the base of 
knowledge for conducting a comparative analysis. Chapter III detailed the methodology 
used to answer the research questions. Chapter IV provided answers to the research 
questions and defended the recommendations contained within this project. This chapter 
will identify the research questions and provide a brief summary of each answer. 
Additionally, the conclusion of this project and opportunities for research are provided.  
A. SUMMARY  
The research endeavored to identify and detail the regulatory framework 
governing all USMC service acquisitions, present common commercial and 
governmental service contracting best business practices, ascertain commercial and 
governmental strategies to encourage innovation, detail current USMC FSC processes, 
and provide recommendations to improve the USMC FSC process. In order to 
accomplish the tasks stated above, a literature review consisting of commercial and 
governmental regulations, laws, publications, articles, reports and journals was 
completed. Full USMC FSC contract files were unavailable during this project; therefore, 
only publicly available FSC contract documents were reviewed. The unavailability of 
FSC contract documents limited the scope of this research and contributed to the 
opportunities for further research.   
A summary of the research questions and research findings is provided below.  
1. What are the current practices and processes used for USMC facilities 
support contracting?  
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Reviewing FSC documents obtained from the government wide point of entry 
enabled a detailed understanding of pre-award phase processes. Moreover, the publicly 
available FSC documents offered insight into award and post-award phase processes and 
enabled the comparative analysis. Although this project never attempted to investigate 
whether the USMC was following all acquisition laws, no violations were discovered and 
it is evident that performance-based contracting methods are utilized.  
Many of the best business practices discovered during the literature review, such 
as conducting market research and awarding FFP contracts, are actively used. However, 
the comparative analysis resulted in the recommending implementation of four 
documented best business practices on USMC FSCs. These are discussed further in the 
second research question summary.     
Practices encouraging innovation were discovered; however, they are minimal 
and deal exclusively with source selection. The USMC is evaluating an offeror’s 
proposed innovative solution as part of the Management Plan evaluation criteria. 
However, I feel providing an innovative solution as part of a proposal is weighted too 
lightly to effectively encourage contractors to devote time toward. The comparative 
analysis resulted in the recommendation to implement four documented strategies to 
encourage innovation on USMC FSCs. More information regarding these practices is 
provided in the third research question summary.  
2. What commercial and governmental best business practices can the 
USMC implement to improve the FSC process?  
Lead the IPT. The Marine Corps is not fully and actively participating in the IPT. 
Without a dedicated effort from the USMC, the IPT cannot function at the optimal level. 
As the primary stakeholder, the USMC must take an active role during all phases of the 
contract life cycle. Doing so will ensure the requirement is accurate and sufficiently 
meets the needs of the installation as well as promotes effective contractor management. 
Due to the annual expenditures tied to FSCs I recommend the IPT Lead to be a senior 
ranking Marine. This step will ensure full member participation and give control of the 
FSC process to Marines.   
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Create a USMC FSC Center of Excellence. The creation and use of a Center of 
Excellence is a common practice for numerous professional fields, including contract 
management. In fact, the Services Acquisition Reform Act (2003) mandated the 
formation of a Center of Excellence for Service Contracting. A FSC Center of Excellence 
would provide a central location for the formation and distribution of common best 
practices and effectively unify multiple efforts under one front.   
Use strategic sourcing to reduce services acquisition costs. The Air Force has 
already reported $481.68 million in base operations support cost savings from FY11-
FY16 via a strategic sourcing program (HQUSAF, 2017). The Marine Corps may not be 
able to expeditiously establish a major command to manage fleet-wide strategic sourcing, 
as the Air Force has done, however, an existing contract vehicle could be leveraged. The 
GSA (2017) has created a government-wide contract vehicle that supports base 
maintenance operations. The IDIQ multiple award contract covers 15 categories of 
services across six nationwide zones. Any federally warranted Contracting Officer can 
easily receive authorization to write task-orders against the GSA contract (GSA, 2017). 
This significantly reduces the contract effort by eliminating the time and personnel 
required to define requirements, conduct market research, generate solicitations, evaluate 
offers, conduct negotiations, and award a contract because GSA has already done the 
work. In addition to a reduction in manpower requirements, the Marine Corps could 
enjoy the same leverage the Air Force gained when they launched their strategic sourcing 
program, however, the Marine Corps would not have to make any upfront investment.   
Forecast beyond the next fiscal year. The importance of forecasting has been 
common knowledge in the civilian marketplace for decades, yet all military branches 
track requirements only for the current year plus one future year (MIHM, 2017). Proper 
uses of the taxonomy, as outlined in Taxonomy for the Acquisition of Services, can fill the 
data gaps preventing accurate future forecasts. The DOD is still struggling with the 
inventory of contracted services (DINAPOLI, 2014), but the USMC should correct this 
deficiency and improve their ability to assess the past and plan for the future.    
3. What strategies and practices can the USMC implement to encourage 
innovation in FSCs? 
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Provide contractors and government personnel with the latitude they need to 
be innovative. This can be partly accomplished by ensuring the government issues an 
RFP with a SOO and allows the offeror to respond with a PWS in their proposal rather 
than releasing a SOW in the solicitation that describes how to specifically complete the 
work (FAR, 2017). Current USMC FSC contain work schedules and worklists, some very 
detailed, that restrict a contractor’s ability to be innovative. This practice must be 
minimized as much as possible in order to encourage innovation.  
Another way that innovative thought can be obtained is by simply asking for it. 
According to Brown (2014), one method to ask for innovative solutions is by releasing a 
pre-solicitation problem statement. This is similar to a SOO, as described by NAVAIR 
(2013), but is even more generalized and brief. A problem statement does nothing more 
than notify potential offerors of a problem that may result in the award of a contract 
(Brown, 2014). Offerors, without restraint, can easily propose any solution they can come 
up with. The buyer then uses this information to generate requirements (Brown, 2014). 
This can often result in obtaining efficient solutions than were previously unknown to the 
buyer. The USMC can easily modify a SOO to act like a problem statement and reap the 
rewards of its use.  
Use private sector advisors to obtain the most current practices and 
technology (FAR, 2016). Expert consultants are better equipped to recommend the most 
efficient solution or product and even identify potential offerors that may not have 
otherwise been considered (Brown, 2014). Furthermore, one must not always be forced to 
pay for a consultant. Brown (2014) says that obtaining free expert advice can be as easy 
as calling a contracting department from a large organization and asking how they 
contract for services. A cost-benefit analysis may prove that hiring an expert consultant 
will result in a negative return on investment; however, the USMC should at least ensure 
that other agencies and businesses contracting for similar services are communicated 
with.   
Create an incentive structure to promote innovation. Rendon, Apte, and Apte 
(2012) revealed that assigning incentives to service contracts or service task orders is not 
common, even though the use of incentives is promoted in FAR part 37 (FAR, 2015). 
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Contractors respond to financial incentives, therefore, offering an incentive to implement 
successful innovative solutions is a sure-fire way to focus a contractor’s energy on 
innovation. However, there are other means of incentivizing a contractor without 
providing an immediate cash incentive (Kessenger, 2015). These strategies include 
building in work hours to do nothing but generate innovative solutions, use past 
innovative performance as a heavily weighted evaluation factor for source selection, and 
evaluate a contractor’s innovation via CORs (Kessenger, 2015; DOD, 2012; Dulkeith & 
Schepurek, 2013).  
Create a culture of innovation. This can be accomplished by promoting 
participation in innovative solution generation, not punishing contractors or government 
employees for failure, and mitigating the risk of innovation (TYEC, 2015; Rathi, 2014; 
Farson & Keyes, 2002). The USMC should only levy punishments when a contractor or 
government employee fails to act rather than acting, in good faith, to improve a process 
(Barba, 2015). Secondly, the Marine Corps should establish innovation awards to 
publicly praise those that participate in and improve the FSC process (TYEC, 2015). 
Lastly, the USMC can mitigate the risk of innovation by using the IPT as the approval 
authority for implementing innovative solutions, establishing abandonment points to halt 
a failing idea, and launching multiple concurrent solutions at the same problem to hedge 
against total failure (Farson & Keyes, 2002). A culture of innovation becomes a breeding 
ground for innovative thought and ensures maximum participation.  
B. CONCLUSION  
Applicable laws and regulations are followed during the USMC FSC process. 
Many of the best business practices identified during the literature review are currently in 
use as well, although improvements can be made to optimize the process. Specifically, 
fully participating in the IPT, using the taxonomy for the acquisition of services to track 
historical usage and generate future forecasts, implement a strategic sourcing program via 
the GSA BMO contract vehicle, and establish a FSC Center of Excellence.   
The research led to the conclusion that innovation is not actively or 
wholeheartedly encouraged on USMC FSCs. This research did not attempt to determine 
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the value of encouraging innovation, but rather offered documented strategies that could 
be implemented, inexpensively, on USMC FSCs. The recommended innovation 
encouraging strategies include affording contractors and government employees the time 
to produce innovative solutions and accepting failure, using monetary and non-monetary 
incentives, communicating with or even hiring private sector experts, and creating a 
culture in which innovative ideas are expected, celebrated, and even rewarded.  
This research was limited by the availability of USMC FSC documents. Contract 
files were not provided via electronic means and a compacted time schedule prevented 
sufficient travel time to physically retrieve them. As such, a holistic review of current 
practices was not possible, which hindered the depth of the comparative analysis. The 
result is the possibility that a recommendation is already standard practice. Concurrently, 
the immense amount academic literature encompassing service contracting best business 
practices and innovation prevented an absolute review of every possible practice. 
Therefore, this project is not meant to serve as the final authority on USMC FSC 
improvements, but should be viewed as a starting point. Contracting is a dynamic activity 
with strategic level importance. As such, new challenges and standard practices enter 
academia and industry daily while other archaic or dated practices fade; continual review 
of the process is critical to ensuring best practices and strategies are employed.     
C. FURTHER RESEARCH  
Continued research on best business practices and innovation encouraging 
strategies should be endeavored. If multiple projects covering the same topic as this paper 
were conducted, they would yield new results. Additionally, I have identified several 
areas requiring focused research below: 
1. Detailed Review of Award Phase and Post-award Phase Marine Corps 
FSC Files 
A comprehensive review of standard practices in the award and post-award 
phases of the contract life cycle and subsequent comparative analysis may result in 
several process improvement recommendations this research could not identify. 
Specifically, a review of the Award Term Plan, Source Selection Plan, Performance 
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Measurement Plan, Performance Incentive Plan, and Quality Assurance Surveillance 
Plan. A comprehensive review would also shed light on areas where innovative thought 
may be valuable or viable.     
2. The Make or Buy Decision 
The Marine Corps is currently using government employees to execute facilities 
support while other USMC installations use contractors. Additionally, HQMC I&L has 
reported price variations between installations. The Project On Government Oversight 
found 94 percent of occupations studied would save money if government workers were 
hired instead of contractors (Pierce, 2011). An analysis of the make or buy decision may 
provide indicators detailing why price variations exist as well as aid the Marine Corps in 
determining the overall best value option between government employees or contractors. 
3. The Value of Innovation 
As mentioned above, this research did not seek to determine if the Marine Corps 
should encourage innovation and if so, then to what degree. However, these are crucial 
questions. There may not be enough value to offset the risk of implementing innovative 
solutions across the board in FSCs, but there may be specific aspects of the FSC process 
or task orders that could greatly benefit.   
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APPENDIX A. QASP TEMPLATE  
The QASP template below is provided as a guide for creating an acceptable 
contractor observation plan. This template was created by the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and posted by the Defense Acquisition 
University (2011). (The yellow highlighted material is part of the original document.) 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE SURVEILLANCE PLAN 
Version – June 2010 
 
For <enter contract title> 
Contract Number: < upon award, enter contract number> 
Contract Description:   < enter contract description >  





This Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) provides a systematic method to 
evaluate performance for the stated contract. This QASP explains the following: 
 What will be monitored. 
 How monitoring will take place. 
 Who will conduct the monitoring. 
 How monitoring efforts and results will be documented. 
 
This QASP does not detail how the contractor accomplishes the work. Rather, the QASP 
is created with the premise that the contractor is responsible for management and quality 
control actions to meet the terms of the contract. It is the Government’s responsibility to 
be objective, fair, and consistent in evaluating performance. In addition, the QASP should 




This QASP is a “living document” and the Government may review and revise it on a 
regular basis. However, the Government shall coordinate changes with the contractor. 
Updates shall ensure that the QASP remains a valid, useful, and enforceable document. 
<As the TMA makes greater use of performance-based service contracting, the 
contractor is given more freedom to become innovative in their ways to effectively 
and efficiently meet the Governments’ performance objectives.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that there be ongoing coordination between the Government and 
contractor during QASP development.   
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Copies of the original QASP and revisions shall be provided to the contractor and 
Government officials implementing surveillance activities. 
 
The following FAR clauses may apply depending on contract type: 
 
< Remove highlighting from applicable clause(s) below. Delete non-applicable clauses. 
>.   
52.246-4 Inspection of Services – Fixed-Price, 
52.246-5 Inspection of Services – Cost-Reimbursement, or 
52.246-6 Inspection of Services – Time-and-Material and Labor-Hour  
 
2. GOVERNMENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 
 
The following personnel shall oversee and coordinate surveillance activities.   
 
a. Contracting Officer (KO) - The KO shall ensure performance of all necessary actions 
for effective contracting, ensure compliance with the contract terms, and shall safeguard 
the interests of the United States in the contractual relationship. The KO shall also assure 
that the contractor receives impartial, fair, and equitable treatment under this contract. 
The KO is ultimately responsible for the final determination of the adequacy of the 
contractor’s performance. 
 
Assigned KO:  <enter name> 
Organization or Agency: <enter organization or Agency name> 
Telephone: <enter number> 
Email: <enter address> 
 
b. Contract Specialist (KS) - The KS acts as an acquisition consultant and serves as 
liaison between the TMA Contract Operations Division – Falls Church (COD-FC) and 
the requesting program office, as well as liaison between the TRICARE Management 
Activity (TMA) and the supporting contracting office. 
 
Assigned KS: <enter name> 
Telephone: <enter number> 
Email: <enter address> 
 
c. Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) - The COR is responsible for technical 
administration of the contract and shall assure proper Government surveillance of the 
contractor’s performance. The COR shall keep a quality assurance file. At the conclusion 
of the contract or when requested by the KO, the COR shall provide documentation to the 
KO. The COR is not empowered to make any contractual commitments or to authorize 
any contractual changes on the Government’s behalf. The contractor shall refer any 
changes they deem may affect contract price, terms, or conditions to the KO for action. 
 
Assigned COR: <enter name> 
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Telephone: <enter number> 
Email: <enter address> 
 
d. Other Key Government Personnel - <enter name or delete these lines if not applicable. 
This may include Performance Monitors, Inspectors, etc., who act on behalf of the COR 
to monitor performance.> 
Title: <enter title> 
Telephone: <enter number> 
Email: <enter address> 
 
3. CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES: 
 
The following employees of the contractor serve as the contractor’s Program Manager 
and Task Manager for this contract.  <Communication should occur with them during 
QASP development. It will help if they review the draft QASP and accept the final 
version.> 
 
a. Program Manager - <upon award, enter name> 
Telephone: <enter number> 
Email: <enter address> 
 
b. Task Manager - <upon award, enter name> 
Telephone: <enter number> 
Email: <enter address> 
 
c. Other Contractor Personnel - <upon award, enter name or delete these lines if not 
applicable> 
Title: <enter title> 
Telephone: <enter number> 
Email: <enter address> 
 




Performance standards define desired services. The Government performs 
surveillance to determine if the contractor exceeds, meets or does not meet these 
standards.   
 
<Performance-based contracts include either a Performance Work Statement (PWS) 
created by the Government, or if a statement of objectives (SOO) is used, a 
government or contractor developed PWS.  The QASP shall cite the same 
performance objectives and thresholds as stated in the Performance Requirements 
section of the PWS.  If the requirement includes a statement of objectives (SOO), the 




The Performance Requirements Summary Matrix, paragraph <enter number> in the 
Performance Work Statement  includes performance standards. The Government shall 
use these standards to determine contractor performance and shall compare contractor 
performance to the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL).  
 
<Insert matrix from the Performance Requirements section in the Performance Work 
Statement for this effort.>  
 
5. INCENTIVES.  
 
The Government shall use <insert award fee, incentive fee, past performance, or other 
method> as incentives. Incentives shall be based on exceeding, meeting, or not 
meeting performance standards. Information about incentives can be found in <insert 
section or paragraph> of the contract. 




Various methods exist to monitor performance. The COR shall use the surveillance 
methods listed below in the administration of this QASP.  
 
Regardless of the surveillance method, the COR shall always contact the contractor’s task 
manager or on-site representative when a defect is identified and inform the manager of 
the specifics of the problem. The COR, with assistance from the COD KS, shall be 





a. DIRECT OBSERVATION.  (Can be performed periodically or through 100% 
surveillance.)   
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
b. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS (MIS).  (Evaluates outputs through the 
use of management information reports. Best used for general surveillance and may need 
to be supplemented by periodic inspections.)  
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
< After contract award, the contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) will need to 
review the Performance Standards Summary Matrix in the contract to determine if 
the selected monitoring methods are appropriate to monitor each performance 
standard.  Within a QASP, multiple surveillance methods may be used.  The method 
for any given task will depend on the performance standard and Acceptable Quality 
Level (AQL). > 
< Place the performance standard(s) after the description of the method.  Delete any 
methods that are not required.> 
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c. PERIODIC INSPECTION.  (Uses a comprehensive evaluation of selected outputs. 
Inspections may be scheduled [Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Quarterly, or annually] or 
unscheduled, as required.) 
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
d. USER SURVEY.  (Combines elements of validated user complaints and random 
sampling. Random survey is conducted to solicit user satisfaction. Appropriate for high 
quantity activities that have historically been satisfactory. May also generate periodic and 
100% inspections.) 
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
e. VALIDATED USER/CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS.  (Relies on the user of the service 
to identify deficiencies. Complaints are then investigated and validated. Highly 
applicable to services provided in quantity and where quality is highly subjective.)  
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
f. 100% INSPECTION.  (Evaluates all outputs. Most applicable to small quantity, but 
highly important services. May be used where there are written deliverables and stringent 
requirements such as tasks required by law, safety, or security.) 
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
g. PERIODIC SAMPLING.  (Variation of random sampling. However, sample is only 
taken when a deficiency is suspected. Good follow-up to MIS analysis. Sample results 
are applicable only for the specific work inspected. Since sample is not entirely random, 
it cannot be applied to total activity performance.) 
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
h. RANDOM SAMPLING.  (Designed to evaluate the outputs of the award requirement 
by randomly selecting and inspecting a statistically significant sample. Highly 
recommended for large quantity repetitive activities with objective and measurable 
quality attributes.)  
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
i. Progress or status meetings. 
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
j. Analysis of contractor’s progress reports.  (Evaluate cost, schedule, etc.) 
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
 
k. Performance reporting.  (Evaluate metrics for a specific time period. Develop metrics 
or use metrics found in MIS.)   
<Insert performance standard(s) or delete this method.> 
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Surveillance results may be used as the basis for actions (to include payment deductions) 
against the contractor. In such cases, the Inspection of Services clause in the Contract 




Metrics and methods are designed to determine if performance exceeds, meets, or does 
not meet a given standard and acceptable quality level. A rating scale shall be used to 





EXCEPTIONAL:    
Performance significantly exceeds contract requirements to 
the Government’s benefit. 
SATISFACTORY:   Performance meets contractual requirements. 
UNSATISFACTORY:   Performance does not meet contractual requirements. 
 
Example 2: 
<A numerical scale with numbers 1 through 10 where 1 is poor and 10 is excellent.>   
 




a. ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE. 
 
The Government shall document positive performance. A report template is attached. 
Any report may become a part of the supporting documentation for fixed fee payments, 
award fee payments, or other actions.  
 
b. UNACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE. 
 
When unacceptable performance occurs, the COR shall inform the contractor. This will 
normally be in writing unless circumstances necessitate verbal communication. In any 
case the COR shall document the discussion and place it in the COR file.   
<State the method(s) that shall be used and delete other methods.  Relate the method 
you select to one or more performance standards.  The rating method may depend on 
the monitoring techniques you select.  One rating method may be used for all 
standards or multiple methods may be used.  Examples are shown below.  However, 
other rating scales are acceptable and may be used. > 
<Documentation must be accurate and thorough.  Completeness, currency, and 
accuracy support both satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance.> 
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When the COR determines formal written communication is required, the COR shall 
prepare a Contract Discrepancy Report (CDR), and present it to the contractor’s task 
manager or on-site representative. A CDR template is attached to this QASP.   
 
The contractor shall acknowledge receipt of the CDR in writing. The CDR will specify if 
the contractor is required to prepare a corrective action plan to document how the 
contractor shall correct the unacceptable performance and avoid a recurrence. The CDR 
will also state how long after receipt the contractor has to present this corrective action 
plan to the COR. The Government shall review the contractor’s corrective action plan to 
determine acceptability.  
 
Any CDRs may become a part of the supporting documentation for contract payment 
deductions, fixed fee deductions, award fee nonpayment, or other actions deemed 
necessary by the KO.  
 
10. FREQUENCY OF MEASUREMENT. 
 
a. Frequency of Measurement. 
 
During contract/order performance, the COR shall take periodic measurements, <enter 
how often> as specified in the AQL column of the Performance Standards Summary 
Matrix, and shall analyze whether the negotiated frequency of measurement is 




b. Frequency of Performance Assessment Meetings. 
 
The COR shall meet with the contractor <enter how often> to assess performance and 




<It may help if the Government prepares a work sheet with a schedule.  This work 
sheet shall be for Government use and shall not be shared with the contractor.> 
<The incentive plan may determine the frequency of performance assessment 
meetings.  COR must review the contract to determine if it includes incentives.  If 
only past performance information is required, state when you will provide interim 
assessments (if required) or a final assessment.  For an award fee plan, state the 
frequency you will provide input on the contractor’s performance to the award-fee 
evaluation board and the KO.  For an incentive fee plan, state the frequency you will 
provide cost information.  For other fee plans, state the frequency and type of 
information you will provide.> 
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Prepared by: <Enter name> 
 
_____________________________ 





1. CONTRACT NUMBER: <insert number> 
 
2. Prepared by: (Name of COR) <insert name> 
 
3. Date and time of observation: 
 
4. Observation:  
 
<Examples of items to include in a report are: 
- Method of surveillance. 
- How frequently you conducted surveillance. 
- Surveillance results. 
- Number of observations.> 
 




_____________________________     ________________ 
Signature – Contracting Officer’s Representative        Date 
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CONTRACT DISCREPANCY REPORT (CDR) 
 
1. Contract Number: <insert number> 
 
2. TO: (Contractor Task Manager or on-site representative) <insert name> 
 
3. FROM: (Name of COR) <insert name> 
 
4. Date and time observed discrepancy: 
 
5. DISCREPANCY OR PROBLEM:  
 
<Describe in detail. Identify any attachments.>  
 
5. Corrective action plan:  
 
A written corrective action plan < is / is not > required. 
 
< If a written corrective action plan is required include the following. > The written 
Corrective Action Plan will be provided to the undersigned not later than < # days after 
receipt of this  
CDR. >  
 
 




_____________________________     ________________ 





_____________________________     ________________ 
Signature - Contractor Task Manager or on-site representative      Date 
 
 
<  The COR may initiate a CDR at any time, including whenever the number of 
monthly recorded defects for a performance standard exceeds the allowable number 
of defects; anytime unacceptable performance is determined critical in nature and 
requires formal corrective action; and whenever an unfavorable trend is detected in 
contractor performance.> 
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APPENDIX B. FAR CLAUSE 52.246-4 INSPECTION OF SERVICES - 
FIXED PRICE  
The full text of FAR Clause 52.246-4 is provided below for the reader’s 
understanding. This clause is required by the FAR (1996) on all fixed-price services 
contracts. 
 
As prescribed in FAR 46.304, insert the following clause: 
Inspection of Services -- Fixed-Price (Aug. 1996) 
(a) Definition: “Services,” as used in this clause, includes services performed, 
workmanship, and material furnished or utilized in the performance of services. 
(b) The Contractor shall provide and maintain an inspection system acceptable to 
the Government covering the services under this contract. Complete records of all 
inspection work performed by the Contractor shall be maintained and made available to 
the Government during contract performance and for as long afterwards as the contract 
requires. 
(c) The Government has the right to inspect and test all services called for by the 
contract, to the extent practicable at all times and places during the term of the contract. 
The Government shall perform inspections and tests in a manner that will not unduly 
delay the work. 
(d) If the Government performs inspections or tests on the premises of the 
Contractor or a subcontractor, the Contractor shall furnish, and shall require 
subcontractors to furnish, at no increase in contract price, all reasonable facilities and 
assistance for the safe and convenient performance of these duties. 
(e) If any of the services do not conform with contract requirements, the 
Government may require the Contractor to perform the services again in conformity with 
contract requirements, at no increase in contract amount. When the defects in services 
cannot be corrected by reperformance, the Government may -- 
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(1) Require the Contractor to take necessary action to ensure that future 
performance conforms to contract requirements; and (2) Reduce the contract price to 
reflect the reduced value of the services performed. 
(f) If the Contractor fails to promptly perform the services again or to take the 
necessary action to ensure future performance in conformity with contract requirements, 
the Government may -- 
(1) By contract or otherwise, perform the services and charge to the Contractor 
any cost incurred by the Government that is directly related to the performance of such 
service; or (2) Terminate the contract for default. 
(End of Clause) 
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APPENDIX C  FAR CLAUSE 52.246-5 INSPECTION OF SERVICES - 
COST REIMBURSEMENT  
The full text of FAR Clause 52.246-5 is provided below for the reader’s 
understanding. This clause is required by the FAR (1984) on all cost-reimbursable 
services contracts. 
 
As prescribed in FAR 46.305, insert the following clause in solicitations and 
contracts for services, or supplies that involve the furnishing of services, when a cost-
reimbursement contract is contemplated: 
Inspection of Services -- Cost-Reimbursement (Apr 1984) 
(a) Definition. “Services,” as used in this clause, includes services performed, 
workmanship, and material furnished or used in performing services. 
(b) The Contractor shall provide and maintain an inspection system acceptable to 
the Government covering the services under this contract. Complete records of all 
inspection work performed by the Contractor shall be maintained and made available to 
the Government during contract performance and for as long afterwards as the contract 
requires. 
(c) The Government has the right to inspect and test all services called for by the 
contract, to the extent practicable at all places and times during the term of the contract. 
The Government shall perform inspections and tests in a manner that will not unduly 
delay the work. 
(d) If any of the services performed do not conform with contract requirements, 
the Government may require the Contractor to perform the services again in conformity 
with contract requirements, for no additional fee. When the defects in services cannot be 
corrected by reperformance, the Government may -- 
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(1) Require the Contractor to take necessary action to ensure that future 
performance conforms to contract requirements; and (2) Reduce any fee payable under 
the contract to reflect the reduced value of the services performed. 
(e) If the Contractor fails to promptly perform the services again or take the action 
necessary to ensure future performance in conformity with contract requirements, the 
Government may -- 
(1) By contract or otherwise, perform the services and reduce any fee payable by 
an amount that is equitable under the circumstances; or (2) Terminate the contract for 
default. 
(End of Clause) 
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APPENDIX D. FAR CLAUSE 52.237-1 SITE VISIT 
The full text of FAR Clause 52.237-1 is provided below for the reader’s 
understanding. This clause is required by the FAR (1984) on all non-construction service 
contracts on government installations. 
 
Offerors or quoters are urged and expected to inspect the site where services are 
to be performed and to satisfy themselves regarding all general and local conditions that 
may affect the cost of contract performance, to the extent that the information is 
reasonably obtainable. In no event shall failure to inspect the site constitute grounds for a 
claim after contract award. 
(End of Provision) 
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APPENDIX E. FAR CLAUSE 52.237-2 PROTECTION OF 
GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, EQUIPMENT, AND VEGETATION 
The full text of FAR Clause 52.237-2 is provided below for the reader’s 
understanding. This clause is required by the FAR (1984) on all non-construction service 
contracts on government installations. 
 
The Contractor shall use reasonable care to avoid damaging existing buildings, 
equipment, and vegetation on the Government installation. If the Contractor’s failure to 
use reasonable care causes damage to any of this property, the Contractor shall replace or 
repair the damage at no expense to the Government as the Contracting Officer directs. If 
the Contractor fails or refuses to make such repair or replacement, the Contractor shall be 
liable for the cost, which may be deducted from the contract price. 
(End of Clause) 
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APPENDIX F. FAR CLAUSE 52.237-3 CONTINUITY OF SERVICES 
The full text of FAR Clause 52.237-3 is provided below for the reader’s 
understanding. This clause is required by the FAR (1991) for all vital services in which 
service interruption is not tolerable. 
 
(a) The Contractor recognizes that the services under this contract are vital to the 
Government and must be continued without interruption and that, upon contract 
expiration, a successor, either the Government or another contractor, may continue them. 
The Contractor agrees to -- 
(1) Furnish phase-in training; and 
(2) Exercise its best efforts and cooperation to effect an orderly and efficient 
transition to a successor. 
(b) The Contractor shall, upon the Contracting Officer’s written notice, 
(1) furnish phase-in, phase-out services for up to 90 days after this contract 
expires and 
(2) negotiate in good faith a plan with a successor to determine the nature and 
extent of phase-in, phase-out services required. 
The plan shall specify a training program and a date for transferring 
responsibilities for each division of work described in the plan, and shall be subject to the 
Contracting Officer’s approval. The Contractor shall provide sufficient experienced 
personnel during the phase-in, phase-out period to ensure that the services called for by 
this contract are maintained at the required level of proficiency. 
(c) The Contractor shall allow as many personnel as practicable to remain on the 
job to help the successor maintain the continuity and consistency of the services required 
by this contract. The Contractor also shall disclose necessary personnel records and allow 
the successor to conduct on-site interviews with these employees. If selected employees 
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are agreeable to the change, the Contractor shall release them at a mutually agreeable 
date and negotiate transfer of their earned fringe benefits to the successor. 
(d) The Contractor shall be reimbursed for all reasonable phase-in, phase-out 
costs (i.e., costs incurred within the agreed period after contract expiration that result 
from phase-in, phase-out operations) and a fee (profit) not to exceed a pro rata portion of 
the fee (profit) under this contract. 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abbruzzese, J. (2016, September 19). Facebook just added a hardware startup to its 
secret projects. Retrieved from http://mashable.com/2016/09/19/facebook-
acquires-nascent-objects/?utm_cid=mash-com-fb-bus-link - VgI87i3j8aq5  
Acquisition Community Connection. (2004). ACE for services. Retrieved from 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=18008    
AFICA. (2016). Enterprise sourcing squadrons. Retrieved from 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/Welcome/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/820804/afica-
enterprise-sourcing-squadrons/#773ESS  
Antonio, R. (2003, November). The fixed-price incentive firm target contract: Not as firm 
as the name suggests. Retrieved from http://www.wifcon.com/anal/analfpif.htm  
Arlen, C. (2008, March 25). Contract performance reviews. Retrieved from 
http://www.serviceperformance.com/articles-2012/17_PerformanceReviews.pdf  
Assad, S. D. (2012). Taxonomy for the acquisition of services and supplies & equipment. 
from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA004219-12-DPAP.pdf  
Australia Department of Treasury. (25 October 2012). Innovation and the procurement 







Balanced Scorecard Institute. (2017). Balanced scorecard basics. Retrieved from 
http://www.balancedscorecard.org/BSC-Basics/About-the-Balanced-Scorecard  
Baldwin, L. H., Camm, F. & Moore, N. Y. (2001). Federal contract bundling: a 
framework for making and justifying decisions for purchased services. Retrieved 
from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1224.html  
Barba, J. (2015, September 28). Companies should penalize employees for their inaction, 




Brown, J. (2014). Bringing innovation to procurement. Retrieved from 
http://www.govtech.com/budget-finance/Bringing-Innovation-to-
Procurement.html  
Calleam Consulting. (2017). 101 common causes. Retrieved from 
http://calleam.com/WTPF/?page_id=2338  
Competition in Contracting Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 2304. (1984). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2304  
Convention on Biological Diversity. (2007). Why is taxonomy important? Retrieved from 
https://www.cbd.int/gti/importance.shtml  
Costello, A. (1997). Incentive strategies for performance-based contracting. Retrieved 
from https://www.acquisition.gov/seven_steps/library/adv0897.pdf  
Coyne K., Coyne S.,& Coyne, Sr., E. J. (2010). When you’ve got to cut costs- now. 
Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2010/05/when-youve-
got-to-cut-costs-now  
Dahl, D. (2011, May 11). 10 tips on how to research your competition. Retrieved from 
https://www.inc.com/guides/201105/10-tips-on-how-to-research-your-
competition.html    
Defense Acquisition Portal. (n.d.). Best value procurement. Retrieved from 
https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Documents/Policy/BestValue4.rtf  
Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement. (2008, January 10). Part 207—acquisition 
planning. Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vfdfara.htm  
Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement. (2016, June 7). Service contracting. 
Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vfdfara.htm  
Defense Acquisition University. (2010). Re: What is the difference between a SOW and 
PWS? [Blog comment]. Retrieved from 
https://dap.dau.mil/aap/pages/qdetails.aspx?cgiSubjectAreaID=0&cgiQuestionID
=104411  








Department of Defense. (2016, January 5). Defense acquisition of services. (DOD 
Instruction 5000.74). Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). 
Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500074p.pdf  
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy. (2015). Defense contingency contracting 
handbook Version 5. Retrieved January 2017 from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/ 
DiNapoli, T. J. (2014, November 19). Defense contractors additional actions needed to 
facilitate the use of DOD’s inventory of contracted services (GAO-15-88). 
Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667059.pdf 
Dulkeith, E. & Schepurek, S. (2013, January). Innovation performance measurement. 
Retrieved from http://www.detecon.com/ru/files/Opinion-Paper-Innovation-
Performance-Measurement-2012.pdf  
EnFocus Solutions. (2012, Feb 7). Why requirements are important? Retrieved from 
http://download.docslide.net/technology/why-requirements-are-important.html 
Farson, R. & Keyes, R. (2002, August). The failure-tolerant leader. Harvard Business 
Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2002/08/the-failure-tolerant-leader  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (1984, April). FAR—Part 52.246-5—Inspection of 
services -- cost reimbursement. Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (1984, April). FAR—Part 52.237-1—Site visit. Retrieved 
from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (1984, April). FAR—Part 52.237-2— Protection of 
government buildings, equipment, and vegetation. Retrieved from 
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (1991, January). FAR—Part 52.237-3—Continuity of 
services. Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (1996, August). FAR—Part 52.246-4—Inspection of 
services -- fixed price. Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2015, March 2). FAR—Part 37—Service contracting. 
Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm    
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2016, October 31). FAR—Part 10—Market research. 
Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
 86 
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2017, January 1). FAR—Part 22—Application of labor 
laws to government acquisitions. Retrieved from 
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2017, January 13). FAR—Part 2—Definitions of words 
and terms. Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm     
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2017, January 13). FAR—Part 6—Competition 
requirements. Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2017, January 13). FAR—Part 15—Contracting by 
negotiation. Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2017, January 13). FAR—Part 16—Types of contracts. 
Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2017, January 13). FAR—Part 48—Value engineering. 
Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm  
Garrett, G. A. (2010). World class contracting (5th ed.). Riverwoods, IL: Navigant 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.  
General Services Administration. (n.d.). Strategic sourcing and FSSI. Retrieved from 
https://strategicsourcing.gov/strategic-sourcing-and-fssi  
General Services Administration. (2005). 7 steps to performance-based services 
acquisition. Retrieved from 
https://gsa.gov/graphics/fas/VETS_Attach_8_Seven_Steps_to_PBA.pdf  
General Services Administration. (2017). Building and maintenance operations. 
Retrieved from https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/121570  




Headquarters U.S. Air Force. (2017). Air force update. Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ss/docs/AirForce%20Strategic%20Sourcing%20Init
iatives.pdf  
Hecker, M. L. (2000). Setting up and managing integrated product teams. Paper 
presented at Project Management Institute Annual Seminars & Symposium, 
Houston, TX. Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute. 
  
 87 
Hildebrandt, G. G. (1998). The use of performance incentives in DOD contracting. 






Innovation. (2017). In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved from https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/innovation 
Krieg, K. J. (2006). Acquisition of services policy. Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2006-3064-ATL.pdf  
Kessenger, E. (2015). Are incentives killing your innovation? Retrieved from 
https://thoughtensemble.com/are-incentives-killing-your-innovation/  
Lambert, S. (2011, May 18). 10 advantages of business forecasting. Retrieved from 
http://www.brighthub.com/office/entrepreneurs/articles/109618.aspx  
Lynch, J. (2013). Pre-bid meetings and site surveys. Retrieved from 
http://procurementclassroom.com/pre-bid-meetings-and-site-visits/  
MAS Blogger. (2012). The competition in contracting act (CICA). [Blog post]. Retrieved 
from https://interact.gsa.gov/blog/competition-contracting-act-cica  
McCann Health. (2016). Is innovation a risky business? Retrieved from 
http://www.mccannhealth.com/is-innovation-a-risky-business/  
Mehta, K. (2012). Five Essential Strategies for Creative Negotiations. Retrieved from 
http://www.ieseinsight.com/fichaMaterial.aspx?pk=99120&idi=2&origen=1&ar=
16  
Mhay, S. & Coburn, C.  (2008). What’s the difference between RFT RFQ RFP RFI? 
Retrieved from http://www.negotiations.com/articles/procurement-terms/  
Mihm, J. C. (2017, February 15). High-risk series (GAO-17-317). Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-317 




Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement. (2016). Service contracting. 
Retrieved from http://farsite.hill.af.mil  
 88 
National Contract Management Association. (n.d.). The contract management standard. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncmahq.org/apply-best-practices/cmbok-standard  
National Association of State Procurement Officers. (2014). The evolution of strategic 
sourcing: Past, present, and future. Retrieved from 
https://www.naspo.org/dnn/portals/16/2013MM/documents/Evolution-of-
Strategic-Sourcing.pdf  
Naval Air Warfare Center. (2013). Guidance for the development of statement of 
objectives (SOO)” Retrieved from 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/nawctsd/Resources/Library/Acqguide/soo.HTM  
Nelson, R. (2007). IT project management: Infamous failures, classic mistakes, and best 
practices. MIS Quarterly Executive University of Virginia. Retrieved from 
http://www2.commerce.virginia.edu/cmit/Research/MISQE%206-07.pdf  
Office of Management and Budget. (2003, May 29). Performance of Commercial 
Activities (Circular A-76 Revised). Retrieved January 2017 from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A76/a76_in
cl_tech_correction.pdf 
Office of Management and Budget. (2005). Implementing strategic sourcing. Retrieved 
from https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=46200  
Office of Federal Procurement Policy. (2011). Performance of inherently governmental 
and critical functions. Retrieved from 
https://energy.gov/management/downloads/ofpp-policy-letter-11-01-performance-
inherently-governmental-and-critical  
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. (2015). 
Implementation directive for better buying power 3.0 - Achieving dominant 
capabilities through technical excellence and innovation. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/BBP3.0ImplementationGuidanceMemorandumforRelease
.pdf  
Office of the Secretary of the Navy. (2015). Highlights of the department of the navy FY 
2016 budget. Retrieved from 
http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/16pres/Highlights_book.pdf  
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. (2016). Operation and maintenance overview 





Office of Personnel Management. (2017). Performance management performance 
management cycle. Retrieved from https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/performance-management/performance-management-
cycle/planning/developing-performance-standards/  
Pierce, F. (2011). POGO report: Billions wasted on government outsourcing. Retrieved 
from http://www.supplychaindigital.com/scm/pogo-report-billions-wasted-
government-outsourcing  
Prajapati, V. (2016, May 6). Forming, storming, norming, performing, and adjourning. 
Retrieved from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/forming-storming-norming-
performing-adjourning-vishal-prajapati  
Prusak, L. (2010, October 7). What can’t be measured. Harvard Business Review. 
Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2010/10/what-cant-be-measured 
Rappaport, A. (1979). Strategic analysis for more profitable acquisitions. Harvard 
Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/1979/07/strategic-analysis-for-
more-profitable-acquisitions  
Rathi, A. (2014, November 19). To encourage innovation, make it a competition. 
Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2014/11/to-encourage-
innovation-make-it-a-competition  
Rendon, R. G. (2001). Outsourcing base operation support functions: The laughlin 
experience. Program Manager Magazine. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305045433_Outsourcing_Base_Operati
ons_Support_Functions 
Rendon, R. G. (2005). Commodity sourcing strategies: Processes, best practices, and 
defense initiatives. Journal of Contract Management, 3(1), 7–21. 
Rendon, R. G., Apte, U. M., & Apte, A. A. (2012). Services acquisition in the DOD: A 
comparison of management practices in the army, navy, and air force. Defense 
Acquisition University Acquisition Research Journal. Retrieved from 
http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/2012/01/Rendon61.pdf  
Rendon R. G. (2015). Benchmarking contract management process maturity: a case study 
of the U.S. Navy. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 22(7), 1481–1508. 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/BIJ-10-2014-0096 








Ruwwe, M. (2016). “We’re the best (In class). General Services Administration Blogs. 
[Blog post] Retrieved from https://gsablogs.gsa.gov/gsablog/2016/09/14/were-
the-best-in-class/  
Services Acquisition Reform Act, 41 U.S.C. Section 428a. (2003). Retrieved from 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt117/html/CRPT-108hrpt117-
pt2.htm     
Schadl, C. (n.d.). Sources sought notices: An opportunity. Retrieved from 
http://www.aptac-us.org/sources-sought/  




Small Business Administration. (n.d.). What is a small business set-aside? Retrieved 
from https://www.sba.gov/contracting/government-contracting-programs/what-
small-business-set-aside 
Supplier Select. (2017). Vendor comparison charts. Retrieved from 
http://www.supplierselect.com/features/scoring_charts/  
The Young Entrepreneur Council. (2015). 18 ways to actively encourage company 
innovation. Small Business Trends. Retrieved from 
https://smallbiztrends.com/2015/09/encourage-company-innovation.html  
United States Army. (2002). Project officers, CORs, and GORs. Retrieved from 
http://www.usamraa.army.mil/pages/pdf/COR_Final_Manual.pdf  
Weckerlein, J. (2013). Air force to launch new standards program. Retrieved from 
http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/109792/air-force-to-
launch-new-standards-program.aspx  




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
